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There was a need for a U.S. stand with more understanding for the Palestinian people's problem, which forms the root and core of the dispute.

AL-AHRAM refers to President as-Sadat's affirmation that Egyptian-U.S. relations have vast areas of joint interest and says: To develop these relations in the best manner that will achieve reciprocal benefits for the two parties in the best possible way, it is necessary to develop the U.S. view of the Palestinian issue and to translate the need to let the Palestinians and their legitimate representatives take part in the settlement efforts into defined practical steps as an indispensable condition for the establishment of peace on solid and firm foundations.

Concluding its commentary, AL-AHRAM confirms that As-Sadat's visit has accomplished a great deal in this connection.

AL-AKHBAR describes President as-Sadat's visit to the United States as a "successful, historic" visit and adds that the most salient features of the success of this visit are:

1. The great change brought about in the inclinations of the American public in the interests of the Arab issue, thanks to the scientific and logical presentation of this issue at the press conferences and incessant meetings which President as-Sadat has held with all of the forces of influence on U.S. decisionmaking and on the formation of public trends.

2. The appearance of the Palestine issue in all U.S. information media, making it possible for the American citizen to see the real core of this issue. Isma'il Fahmi expressed this fact by saying that the fundamental aim of President as-Sadat's visit to the United States was to present the Palestinian issue in the best way possible to the officials and the American people.

3. The development of the relations between the two countries in the interests of progress and a just peace. Without a doubt, the agreement for the sale of two atomic reactors to Egypt clearly expresses this cooperation.

AL-AKHBAR adds: If we were to add to this the clarity of the Egyptian stand concerning a number of fundamental issues, including the need to balance the U.S. role in the Middle East, check the plunge into arming Israel with advanced arms, and push the U.S. position toward recognition of the Palestinian people's right to take part in the efforts for settling the Middle East crisis, then the preliminary results, even before the issuance of the joint statement, show a success that went beyond all expectations.

AL-JUMHURIYAH says that President as-Sadat's visit to the United States has fully succeeded in achieving its principal aims, considering that it is a political visit in the first place. The paper points out that by this visit, President as-Sadat opened a field which has been monopolized for a quarter of a century by Israel and the Zionist forces. He flooded the minds of the American people with the Arab and Palestinian issue and made it the object of their daily interest, not from the Israeli standpoint as it has always been, but from the Arab standpoint for the first time.

AL-JUMHURIYAH adds that it is difficult to imagine today that the United States will from now on be able to practice its absolute alinement with Israel without taking into consideration the new relations established by the visit and without taking into consideration the consequences any step taken in favor of Israel may have on peace and stability in the Middle East.

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AL-AHRAM RESUMES PUBLICATION OF AS-SADAT'S MEMOIRS

Cairo MENA in Arabic 2222 GMT 23 Oct 75 NC

[Text] Cairo, 23 October--In its Friday edition, AL-AHRAM publishes another chapter of President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat's memoirs.

In its introduction of these memoirs, AL-AHRAM says that it has obtained President as-Sadat's approval to publish another chapter of his memoirs which he has been taping since the middle of 1974. So far 10 tapes have been used and the memoirs are not complete yet. They deal with Egyptian events in the domestic, Arab and international spheres since As-Sadat assumed the office of president of the republic. The memoirs are now being arranged for publication in a book to be available for research, study and historical record.

AL-AHRAM says: Today, on the occasion of the first official visit by the president of the Egyptian Republic to the United States, AL-AHRAM publishes the part of President as-Sadat's memoirs on the events and developments of relations between Egypt and the United States since he assumed office. AL-AHRAM adds: President as-Sadat said in the preface to his memoirs, which AL-AHRAM previously published: I reserve some of what I have taped for publication to preserve the supreme pan-Arab interest toward certain states. There is no need to raise or deal with these anew under the present circumstances. However, they will all be taped for publication if necessary for publication by others when they become the property of history. Following is the text of President as-Sadat's memoirs which AL-AHRAM publishes in its Friday edition:

Since its inception, the 23 July revolution's principles and objectives were to not define an Egyptian stand partial to any international bloc, either for the West or for the East. However, the basic principle and constant objective was to preserve for Egypt its independent personality and freedom from any international political monopoly that would put it in a position of submission or surrender to the West or to the East. Therefore, Egypt and the Egyptian international policy was one of the principal pillars which established for the world the nonaligned block and which called for neutrality between the two blocs with the determination that it should be a positive not negative neutrality--namely isolation from the fate of the world which is linked with our destiny. Egypt's independent personality means that Egypt shall assume self-responsibility for preserving its freedom, restoring its rights and achieving its interests.

Egypt's attitude toward each of the two great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, was defined on the bases of achieving these just interests, namely that the stand adopted by Egypt mostly reflected its reaction to the stand adopted by either of the two great powers regarding their response to the rights and interests demanded by Egypt. Since any development in the Egyptian policy always affected the U.S. stand which was based on imposing the continuity of the old conditions that existed between Egypt and the Western world, such development has always caused alienation between Egypt and the United States. At the same time it led to increased rapprochement and broader dealing with the Soviet Union until it reached the stage in which it was said that Egypt was the gate through which the Soviet Union was able to achieve its presence in the Middle East.

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Despite this, Egypt was keen to keep a thread, even thin, linking it with the United States. Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir was eager to establish a personal relationship with U.S. President Kennedy. They exchanged private letters. This relationship resulted in a \$300 million aid agreement between Egypt and the United States despite the fact that there were many crisis which resulted from Egypt's participation in the Yemeni revolution. Kennedy's enemies went so far as to say then that the United States paid the expenses of the Yemeni war, meaning the aid which Kennedy gave Egypt.

Undoubtedly, one of the main aims of Israel and one on which it depends was to break up the relations between Egypt and Israel so that they may adopt hostile attitudes toward each other, enabling Israel to exploit all the U.S. forces in the interest of its continued presence and the realization of its expansionist ambitions. Israel has perhaps been seeking to realize this since the early days of the 23 July revolution when it feared least the U.S. policy adopt an attitude of friendship toward this revolution. Israel instigated the acts of aggression against the U.S. establishments in Cairo and Alexandria, later known as the Lavon affair, to depict the revolution as hostile to the U.S. presence in the area.

The Israeli attempts reached their peak after the assassination of Kennedy and Johnson's assumption of the U.S. presidency which he began by his famous letter to Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir demanding the United States be given the right to inspect the Egyptian forces and threatening to arm Israel enough to win any war against the Arabs. Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir reacted to this letter by expelling Talbot, the U.S. President's envoy, from his office. This took place in 1965, the year when Israel began to prepare for the 1967 war with the approval of Johnson, a matter confirmed by the many analyses published on the developments of the U.S. stand.

Johnson had fully submitted to the Zionist centers on which he depended to achieve material personal gains for his family. He reiterated the same logic of Israel which was trying to control the U.S. policy, Israel reasoned that it could become the center of power and the U.S. military base in the area rather than for the United States to set up its own bases and earn hostility which it could do without. Israel also argued that it could become the protective fence against any Soviet infiltration in the area. I am not exaggerating when I say that Israel succeeded in strengthening its presence in the area as a result of the gap it created between the Arabs and the United States and that the Arabs could have always been in a stronger position concerning the U.S. interests and Israel's ambition had they dealt with the Americans on the basis of joint interests and mutual respect. As I said before, this led to what happened in 1967.

After 1967 war, the relations between Egypt and the United States were completely severed as a national reaction to the latter's attitude in this LAR, despair of reaching any kind of contact between Egypt and the United States reached the extent that 'Abd an-Nasir delegated Moscow's leaders to assume contact with Washington on behalf of Egypt to agree on any solution or stand which might change the results of the 1967 defeat.

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This delegation produced no results and achieved no step or hope for a step on which Egypt could rely on the basis that Israel is fully dependent on the United States and will not make any move unless as the result of pressure from Washington and that Egypt cannot prepare any military plan for confronting Israel without taking into account the U.S. stand.

What I have said describes the history of our relations with the United States, a history that would have continued in its course toward the same direction had not relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union developed in an adverse manner following the 1967 defeat. The result of the Soviet Union's stand was that relations between Egypt and the United States began to develop. This development began when Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir accepted Rogers' initiative in 1970. Many may know that 'Abd an-Nasir accepted Rogers' initiative when he was sitting on the negotiations table with the Soviet leaders in Moscow. He told them that he was forced to accept this as a result of Moscow's unwillingness to meet Egypt's requests for arms. The odd thing was that the Soviet leaders did not attack 'Abd an-Nasir for accepting Rogers' initiative--or perhaps it was not odd for Soviet policy. At the time I was in Cairo discharging the responsibilities of vice president. After the announcement of Rogers' initiative I called on the political leaderships to assemble and we decided to reject this initiative out of the belief that Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir would return from Moscow with an agreement and having secured all our requests for arms.

I received Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir at the airport. I imagined that he had returned looking more youthful and had regained his health as a result of his medical treatment in the Soviet Union. Then while I was with him I was surprised to find that his political and psychological state of mind were not as good as his health appeared to be. I was even more surprised when he informed me that he had decided to accept Rogers' initiative, that he had accepted it and announced its acceptance in the presence of the Soviet leadership, because he had despaired of agreeing with them on a clear and straight line that would insure the attainment of results in any course that he may pursue along with them. Israel had accepted Rogers' initiative so as to relieve itself of the attrition war, and relying on what it and the whole world had become accustomed to, namely the Arabs' rejection of every opportunity or attempt to resolve peacefully the conflict between them and Israel. Israel accepted Rogers' initiative on the basis that 'Abd an-Nasir would reject it, only to be strongly surprised with 'Abd an-Nasir's acceptance. Israel's attitude then changed quickly. Israel became the party rejecting Rogers' initiative and creating pretexts to justify its rejection.

Israel exerted terrific pressures on Rogers and made him to understand that his entire future is dependent on which side he took between the two parties to the conflict. The United States succumbed to Israel, and indeed, both of them joined in protesting against us on the pretext that we had moved missiles from their positions at the time Rogers' initiative was accepted. The United States and Israel waged a joint campaign in the world at large, accusing Egypt of having violated the provisions of Rogers' initiative, and that consequently Israel had (?the right) not to implement the first clause of the Rogers' plan which calls for Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories it occupied.

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It was clear from this that the United States would not take any serious measure to implement this initiative which bears the name of the secretary of state, particularly in view of Israel's attitude at the time which went so far that the Israeli Foreign Minister Aba Eban told Rogers that the United States was intruding in matters that were of no interest to it and with which it should not concern itself. Eban then expressed his opinion on the Arabs and said that they were a backward people who would never be of any importance, that we understood only the language of force and fear, and that it was time for us to come on our knees in submission to Israel which knew how to deal with us.

After 'Abd an-Nasir's death--which occurred during the Rogers' initiative, which came into effect on 7 August 1970--I had to decide on the course which we should pursue when the Rogers' initiative terminated on 7 November, whether to renew it or ignore it.

After studying the situation I found that domestic and international conditions at the time made it incumbent to renew the Rogers' initiative. Therefore, I sent Mahmud Riyad, then foreign minister, to the United Nations and we announced the renewal of the cease-fire for another 90 days, until 4 February 1971.

The United States, however, did not take our decision seriously because of the rumors shrouding Egyptian policy at the time, and it was said--through insinuations and as a matter of fact--that I was incapable of making any decision and that my days in office were numbered. The centers of power were the source of these rumors which had been circulating since 'Abd an-Nasir's funeral.

U.S. President Nixon sent one of his secretaries of state to the funeral--Elliot Richardson, a distinguished Republican and presently U.S. ambassador to Great Britain. He led a delegation which included (McCloy), an American expert on the Middle East.

After returning home from the funeral, Richardson wrote a report on his visit to Egypt saying As-Sadat would not last in power long, that he would stay for another 2 or 4 weeks at the most. Richardson reported that he had arrived at this conclusion after studying the conditions in Egypt and after contacting concerned persons in the country. This was not Richardson's opinion alone, for it was also the opinion of the U.S. Government and the CIA. In our first meeting, Kissinger told me that Richardson's report is still kept in the files of the U.S. State Department as an historical document from which U.S. officials can learn not to be deceived by false appearances nor by irresponsible information.

The first contact I had with President Richard Nixon took place on 24 December 1970. He sent me a letter thanking me for Egypt's participation in the late President Dwight Eisenhower's funeral, in which Egypt was represented by its prime minister at the time, Mahmud Fawzi. Nixon sent the letter to Dr Fawzi and asked him to deliver it to me, since there were no diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States at the time.

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When I received and read the letter I summoned Donald Burgess who was in charge of U.S. interests in Egypt, told him of the letter and said to him: I consider this letter to be a new precursor which will perhaps open the way for new Egyptian-U.S. relations and return them to normal. Consequently, we are prepared to respond to every step taken by the Americans. Every good precursor on their side will be met with even a better precursor on our side. However, if your side resorts to the contrary, our side will take measures that will be worse than yours.

I replied with a letter explaining to U.S. President Nixon that it was time for the United States to play its role in resolving this dispute, that as a superpower it was responsible for the continuation of this explosive situation, that we sought only peace and were aware that the United States was the only power which could influence Israel, which was completely dependent on the United States in its daily life. If the United States followed the right path for restoring matters to their normal conditions, it would receive every response and understanding from us.

I also emphasized in my letter that we would not ever capitulate. The ferocious psychological warfare waged against us at the time gave everybody the impression that we were on our way to capitulation or death. The object of my letter was that my confrontation should be with the root--the United States--because the confrontation with the branch--Israel--assumed a different form particularly since that the branch always tried to exert pressure on the root to serve its expansionist objectives in the area.

The situation remained unchanged until March 1971. On the 7th of this month, I made a speech announcing the end of our commitment to any cease-fire. I also said that the initiative I announced on 4 February 1971 still stood and that we were prepared to implement it if Israel responded to it and its terms. Israel did not reply as its arrogance made it believe that the conditions in the area had stabilized and were subject to its will for the next half century but the United States moved to save face. I received a letter from William Rogers asking to me in Cairo.

Rogers arrived in Egypt on 3 May 1971. We had long discussions for 2 and 1/2 hours. Rogers spoke of my initiative and admitted that the United States was hearing for the first time a new language and a practical method which understood the spirit of our age and that he fully appreciated the desire for a peaceful solution and for avoiding a return to the battlefield. I will pause a little here to state that during our meeting, Rogers told me that he was surprised by the refined way he was treated by the Egyptians everywhere and on all the levels. He came to Cairo with the idea that the people in Egypt would throw bricks, tomatoes and eggs at him as a spontaneous expression of the vestiges which destroyed the healthy relations between Egypt and the United States. Rogers walked in Cairo streets and met many Egyptians who spoke to him very pleasantly, aware of who he was. No guards surrounded him. Rogers expressed his astonishment at this reception.

I told him: Do not be astonished. We are the people who gave civilization to the world 70 centuries ago.

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Therefore, it is not strange that we should be civilized even in our enmity. Civilization does not discriminate between friendship and enmity. A person civilized in his friendship is also civilized in his enmity. My meeting with Rogers ended with a promise from him that the United States would seek to achieve the initiative which I had announced. He told me that Golda Meir, the then prime minister of Israel, summoned the U.S. ambassador in Tel Aviv and asked him to convey a message to Nixon and Rogers challenging any Arab leader to accept a peace agreement with Israel and to declare this officially. Everybody was surprised that I announced in my initiative our readiness to conclude a peace agreement with Israel in addition to the other clauses which provided for Israel's complete withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied after 1967 and to the passes as a first step and that we were prepared to extend the cease-fire for 6 months provided that Gunnar Jarring came up with a solution to the problem in this period. All this constituted a preparation for the discussions on Israel's withdrawal, the crossing of the Egyptian forces and the restoration of our relations with the United States on the basis that it was the root cause of the entire issue.

Golda Meir had told Rogers that if any Arab leader accepted her challenge, Israel would put all its cards on the table, as the American expression goes. Therefore Israel had no other excuse to use as a pretext. Rogers was then to go immediately to Golda Meir to tell her that an Arab leader had at last been found who had declared his readiness for peace and that she only had to put her cards on the table in order to finally solve the problem.

I then asked Rogers if the United States had other demands from Egypt. He said absolutely not and asserted that our position was 100 percent sound and he demanded nothing from us. What he wanted, however, inevitably had to come from Israel since the ball was now in its court and it must reply. Rogers left Cairo on this basis. Deep inside I was not confident Rogers really wanted to do something. Also Joseph Sisco, the most important member of the American delegation, seemed unsympathetic with the Arabs on this matter at the time. I was aware then that his behavior was due to having worked as an assistant to Arthur Goldberg, head of the American delegation in the United Nations during the 1967 aggression--the aggression which was planned by Johnson with Israel. I frankly said so to Sisco in front of Rogers. And I told him that we felt that Sisco represented Israel in the talks because he was influenced by his long time work with Goldberg. However, it has been proved that Sisco takes no sides and adopts no stand except within the confines of the policy that is mapped out by the White House and the U.S. State Department.

Israel was surprised, or rather shocked, because it had planned its policy on the basis that no Arab leader would conclude a peace agreement with it. Thus, the Arabs succeeded for the first time in embarrassing Israel in front of its ally. Israel did not keep quiet and, indeed--as has always been its habit--it lacked no tricks and reverted to employing its old traditional method by exerting pressure on the U.S. Government from within. The result was that Rogers' visit and my initiative came to nothing. Israel then began again to reiterate the tune that it knows very well how to deal with the Arabs who fear nothing but force and violence and that the United States should relax because the Arabs will sooner or later come and kneel down to ask for pardon because they have no power and no strength whether on the military or political levels. In order to irrevocably destroy Rogers' endeavors and my initiative at the same time, Golda Meir stood up in parliament and taught Rogers a lesson by reproaching him because he had interfered in a matter that did not concern him.

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As usual, the Zionist circles in the United States grabbed the speech and propagated it. This marked the beginning of the end of Roger's political future.

On 7 July 1971, a representative of the U.S. State Department came to me bearing a message from Rogers. I found out later that the U.S. President had no knowledge of this message. The message inquired about some points connected with Rogers' visit early in May. We had concluded the Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty in the wake of the corrective revolution on 15 May. The inquiry included a question as to whether this treaty restricted Egypt's freedom of movement in the field of [word indistinct]. The envoy then asked me whether I still held the view that the United States had a role it must play in the Middle East issue. I replied in the affirmative.

The envoy then told me that he was authorized to notify me that the U.S. President himself has decided to intervene from that night so that my initiative would assume its dimensions and proceed on the road of peaceful solution, and that the United States would put all its weight and its capabilities to achieve everything contained in my initiative. The meeting ended at this point.

I was informed later on that Israel had been informed by its agents in the State Department about Rogers' message, and raised hell until it frustrated every step the United States could have taken in this sphere. A strange development then took place. I had announced during 1971 that that year would be the decisive year for the issue--either by peace or war. However, the Soviet policy did everything in its power for this not to be achieved in order to embarrass me before the Arab world. It depended mainly on the withholding of the arms supplies which I needed in order to enter the battle, and at the same time did not try to employ any pressure to arrive at a peaceful settlement for a simple reason: It did not possess the means to employ such pressures.

Rogers exploited the devious Soviet policy to cover up the failure of his efforts to solve the problem and in order to regain Israel's approval, which he had lost by visiting Egypt.

On 1 January, 1972, Rogers stated that Egypt was saying things it did not mean. Otherwise, where was the year of decision it has trumpeted so long? Rogers' attempt to secure the goodwill of Israel did not stop at that, but he announced, without embarrassment at all, that the United States has agreed with Israel in November 1971 to produce certain types of weapons in addition to doubling the quantity of arms it supplied to it. In doing so, Rogers was trying to share with Israel its large-scale campaign against the Arabs so perhaps it would forgive him and would leave him in the post of secretary of state. However, Israel did not have mercy on him and destroyed his political future completely.

I in turn did not have mercy on Rogers. In fact, I announced publicly that the U.S. secretary of state was a liar and did not honor his obligations. If I tolerated the deviousness of the Soviet policy, it was because at least the Soviets were the only supplier of my arms.

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But what reason was there for me to tolerate the lies of the foreign minister of a state which was sparing no effort to make Israel continuously superior over me and to enable it to threaten any spot in the region without deterrence or even reply. I did not accept at all the idea that Rogers should bargain with Israel at our expense after he claimed the role of a neutral judge. The Egyptian-U.S. relations remained extremely tense throughout the rest of Rogers' term as secretary of state. After Rogers departure from office and Dr Henry Kissinger's assumption of the post of U.S. secretary of state, Egyptian-U.S. relations began to take a new turn. At this juncture I must pause to record an important matter. This is that the appointment of Kissinger came after my decision to end the mission of the Soviet experts in July 1972--the decision which the Soviets thought was an Egyptian plot in conjunction with the United States, and which later became clear to all that it is a 100 percent national Egyptian decision, although some people said at the time that I could have bargained with the Americans in return for the expulsion of the Soviet experts. However, my ethics do not allow me to bargain with the state which did its utmost to bring about my defeat on the state that stood by me in my darkest hours.

Some time after he assumed his new post Kissinger sent a letter in which he expressed his personal interest to meet any Egyptian official at any level because he felt that the United States had a responsibility to the Middle East question which it wanted to carry out. Thus correspondence between us and the Americans began through the official in charge of U.S. interests in Cairo. It was agreed that Kissinger should meet with Hafiz Isma'il [adviser to the Egyptian president] in October of the same year, 1972. Despite this step I realized fully well that the United States would act only within the bounds of the reality which every day emphasized Israel's victory and domination of the region, while the Arabs did not do any tangible concrete thing to change this reality, or even to activate it. Therefore, my belief in the necessity of the battle was unshakable, on the basis that it is the only language which all the warring parties and all the parties concerned could understand.

I shall give an example which underline my belief at the time. On Thursday, 4 October 1973, 2 days before the war, the then Israeli foreign minister, Abba Eban, was on one of the usual Israeli fund-raising tours in the United States. On that same day an appointment had been fixed between Kissinger and Abba Eban. I later knew that Kissinger told Abba Eban that the Israelis were in a superior position, and consequently an initiative for solving the problem must come from them, for it was difficult for the Arabs, while defeated, to take the measures that would lead to a solution to the problem.

Kissinger added that the United States was prepared to play a positive role to this end, particularly since the U.S. elections were round the corner. Abba Eban's answer, however--as it was reported to me--was very strange indeed. Eban asked in surprise, why Israel had to take the initiative when the Arabs would be of no political or military importance for the next 50 years. Eban then advised Kissinger that the United States should not waste its time, for Israel knew very well how to deal with the Arabs who submitted only to the logic of force and coercion which Israel applied to them from time to time, so that they would not at any moment imagine that they will be of any importance.

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It seems that Kissinger had then believed Eban, for the facts confirmed the truth of what he said. Kissinger met twice with Hafiz Isma'il in response to his invitation. These two meetings resulted in no developments because the reality with all its dimensions was strongly imposing itself and Kissinger was studying the probabilities of the Middle East question to try his diplomacy in it.

When Kissinger heard about the outbreak of the battles, he believed that I had committed a big error by declaring war and that Israel would undoubtedly destroy all my forces and consequently destroy all opportunities, regardless of how slim, for reaching a peaceful solution. Kissinger viewed the new Egyptian policy as a logical policy which could help reaching a reasonable peaceful solution particularly after I submitted my initiative in which I laid my conditions for concluding a peace agreement with Israel. This did not mean that the United States was prepared to give us anything despite Israel but that it was moving within the limits of the tangible concrete reality. The liberation of the land was our task and nobody would take part in it unless we proved our practical ability in this respect. I told the story of the opinion Kissinger expressed when he met with Hafiz Isma'il in my speech to the people on 28 September.

Kissinger contacted U.S. President Nixon and conveyed his deep regret for the outbreak of the battles in the Middle East and that his assessment of the situation was that Israel would score a legendary victory greater than its 1967 victory. Kissinger's suppositions were confirmed when Israel contacted the United States and asked a grace of 2 days to break the bones of the Arabs in Egypt and Syria and reserved its right that the United States compensate it for the weapons it would lose in the war.

Great surprise came when Kissinger received the famous Israeli request for aid after 4 days of the war which read: Save Israel. Kissinger and all the United States realized then that the center of weight has finally shifted to Egypt and that the United States must deal with Egypt which was prepared to deal with it as an equal.

Egypt proved it was able to involve the United States with its allies when the United States first declared atomic mobilization without consulting these allies. Egypt was able to win the whole world public opinion to its side having lost it after the 1967 war. Egypt also unveiled the reality of the detente between the superpowers.

As a result of this, the United States acted quickly, Kissinger came here in November when I met him for the first time. My talk with him began about the Israeli pocket. I frankly told him that the pocket was under my mercy and that it was in my power to destroy it whenever I wanted. It was then that Kissinger started with me a direct and frank dialog during which we agreed on the discussions of the 101 km.

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Chapter Three

Cairo MENA in Arabic 0855 GMT 25 Oct 75 JN

[Text] Cairo, 25 October--In the third chapter of his memoirs being published in AL-AHRAM, President Anwar as-Sadat today speaks about Egyptian-U.S. relations following the October 1973 war and the development of these relations thanks to the efforts exerted by U.S. Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger.

The president also speaks about the warm welcome accorded by the Egyptian people to President Richard Nixon during his visit to Egypt. The president describes this warm welcome as the result of the people's extreme annoyance with the tendentious and suspicious treatment the Soviet Union had been according us--be that 'Abd an-Nasir or myself. Thus, through their warm welcome of Nixon, the people were telling the Soviets that we will not live at the mercy of anyone, whoever he may be.

The following is the text of the Third Chapter of President as-Sadat's memoirs.

Relations between Egypt and the United States were restored thanks to the efforts exerted by Kissinger. President Nixon wanted to crown this accomplishment by a visit to the area, to counteract the Watergate incident, which had dominated almost all aspects of political life in the United States. Nixon, through Kissinger, had left his mark on the new detente policy between the United States and China and the Soviet Union. He also managed to end the Vietnam war, in which the United States had been involved throughout the sixties and the beginning of the seventies. There remained only the Middle East for Nixon to prove his political stature. Perhaps he might thus obliterate the marks of the Watergate scandal which had begun haunting him. That is why Nixon decided to visit the area, beginning with Egypt, then Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Israel.

Nixon came to Egypt. It never occurred to me that the people would give him that legendary welcome. Nobody expected this reception and what is more, the security men accompanying him asked him not to take an open car, based on fear stemming from their traditional idea of the hostility which dominated Egyptian-U.S. relations for a long time, particularly after the 1967 defeat. But all were astounded the minute the motorcade began moving from the airport to Al-Qubbah Palace. The people went out with surprising spontaneity to express their overwhelming desire to have an open door to the outside world, free from the restrictions, aftermaths, and complexes which had hampered their march for a long time. The reception was so warm and harmonious that no one could, for example, claim that the ASU had exercised its influence as a political organization to push these enormous crowds out in such a legendary force. Even if it were possible to push the masses out into the streets it would have been impossible to wrest from them these warm cheers. Whereas it might have been possible to line up the masses along the sides of the street, it would have been impossible to make them stand on windows and balconies to greet the U.S. President in this form. This behavior is considered the biggest proof of our people's profound consciousness of history and culture. They are a people who do not show hostility for the sake of hostility, but for the sake of dignity and pride. Since the causes for hostility had ceased to exist, there was no justification for its continuation. Our people are therefore capable of showing hostility and exacting vengeance, and they are also capable of showing friendship and granting forgiveness.

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In my belief, the people wanted by this welcome to express their extreme annoyance with the tendentious and suspicious treatment the Soviet Union had been according us, be that 'Abd an-Nasir or myself. Thus through their warm welcome of Nixon, they were telling the Soviets that we will not live at the mercy of anyone, whoever he may be.

When we arrived at Al-Qubba Palace, each of us delivered a speech, in the evening, a banquet was held at Al-Qubba Palace. During the supper, we exchanged speeches. In my speech, I emphasized that the Palestinian issue was the root of the problem in the Middle East and if it were not solved, then there could be no possible solution to the Middle East problem. Certain political observers commented on the emphasis I put on this and said I was making Nixon's mission more difficult and that I was placing him in a predicament from which it was hard to get out.

But Nixon was not one of those politicians who measures every word and stand with unnecessary sensitivity. That is why in his speech of reply he improvised an objective answer in which he touched upon all aspects of the issue. His habit of improvising indicated that his thoughts flowed in streams and that he could grasp all elements of a subject without any effort worth mentioning. After dinner Nixon and those accompanying him attended a small folklore show. The satellite transmitted via one of the stations everything that took place during the dinner and the subsequent show, which was attended by the accompanying U.S. delegation.

In accordance with the itinerary for the visit, the following day we took a train from Al-Qubba Palace to Alexandria. The effusive and warm welcome that took place in Cairo cannot be compared with the splendidity of what we saw along the entire route from Cairo to Alexandria, which had been transformed into a route of resounding and warm cheers and waving banners. Nevertheless, what took place in Alexandria was beyond description and imagination. Nixon's procession from Sidi Jabir to Ra's at-Tin Palace was greeted with a welcome such as I believe Alexandria had never before witnessed. The Americans did not know that I was more astonished than they by this warm welcome. The only explanation is, as I said, that our people, who have known civilization for 7,000 years, can swiftly forget hatred to concentrate all their energy on the continuation of their cultural march, especially when the United States had stood on our side in the disengagement of forces and when relations between us had returned to normal.

During the meeting, I officially declared that U.S. conduct toward us was an example of trust and sincere desire to achieve an honorable solution to the Middle East question and therefore we must not ask why the Egyptian people gave this enormous welcome to President Nixon even before we met and discussed things and reached any agreement. In my opinion this was like addressing an intelligent and indirect message to the Soviet Union to make it certain of the complete failure of Soviet policy in the Middle East.

Here I would like to put on record during this talk that in all the political, military, and fateful decisions I made I was inspired by the spirit of culture which characterizes the deep awareness of our ancient people. When I announced my initiative in February 1971, when I ended the domination of the power centers in May 1971, when I terminated the Soviet experts mission in July 1972, and when I made other fateful decisions, the people quickly understood them and realized the objective reasons which led to these decisions. A people with such profound awareness and rare intelligence can never submit to any force in history, no matter how tyrannical.

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We arrived at Ra's at-Tin in the evening. Nixon gave a banquet in return for the dinner I gave at the Al-Qubbah Palace. The banquet was 100 percent American. All the food was flown in from the United States and sailors from one of the ships of the U.S. fleet served the guests. The ship had come especially to Alexandria shortly before Nixon's arrival for this particular mission. There was also an American band, which had arrived aboard the same plane that brought the food, to play during the banquet. The atmosphere was extremely cordial. Astonishment over the tremendous welcome never left Nixon throughout his visit. The commentators and journalists and security men who accompanied Nixon were equally astonished and they forgot talk about security measures because they were so completely dazzled by what was taking place before their eyes.

The talks continued in the train and in Al-Ma'murah before the banquet. All the talk revolved around the imperative need to maintain the constant momentum of the peace process. Nixon appeared confident of himself and of his political future and did not attach any importance to the Watergate incident. He affirmed that it did not disturb him at all and that he had decided to stay in office until the end of his constitutional term.

It was important to me that we reach agreement concerning certain points. These were:

1. The stage that would follow the disengagement which had taken place, so that the peace process could maintain the momentum necessary for its continuation.
2. This point revolved around the economic situation, which preoccupied a great deal of my attention, since after the October 1973 war and up to time of Nixon's visit we have been carrying on thanks to the momentum created by the money paid by our Arab brothers directly after the battle, that is Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar. These are the countries that paid in a manner for which one cannot express sufficient appreciation. They paid voluntarily and willingly.

Saudi Arabia gave us 200 million dollars and Kuwait 200 million dollars. Abu Dhabi did not have anything in its treasury to contribute as support because at that time it had nationalized the oil companies and paid them the value of their shares. Abu Dhabi tried to borrow from the United States, which turned it down. But Shaykh Zayid managed to borrow 100 million dollars from Britain and he gave it to Egypt without waiting for one word of thanks and thus set an example for Arab chivalry at its best.

Economically we were getting along despite our deficiencies. The Arab funds were enough to save us from bankruptcy, but not enough to get our economy back on its feet again. The root of this matter went back much earlier than the pre-battle era. It went back to the beginning of the sixties and to 'Ali Sabri's cabinet. Problems piled up and obstacles followed one upon another. Instead of solving them as they came up, one cabinet passed them on to another, that is, 'Ali Sabri's passed them on to that of Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din which in turn passed them to that of Sidqi Sulayman. This continued until the state's basic economic structure collapsed and then the 7 lean years followed to wipe out what was left in the Egyptian treasury. In the light of all these facts, the economy was a pressing priority directly following that of the continuation of the peace process.

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3. The third point I discussed with Nixon was the atomic reactor which we asked the United States to set up for us near Alexandria to desalinate the sea water and to enable us to cultivate the desert, which constitutes 96 percent of the area of our country, the green area covering 3 or 4 percent at most.

4. The fourth point in my talks with Nixon was that I asked to buy arms directly, without any go-betweens. There were possibilities to purchase arms from the United States through Saudi Arabia and Iran. The two countries had welcomed such a task, but I thanked them for their good and fraternal offices and informed them that it was time to deal with the United States without a go-between, particularly after my decision to diversify the sources of arms, after which we managed to buy arms from France. We are also buying from Britain certain electronic equipment, precision aiming equipment, fire guidance equipment, and other such modern equipment.

I found complete understanding on all the four points I discussed with Nixon. We agreed completely on the first point, which defined the stage following Israel's withdrawal in September or October at most and stipulated that it should include the passes and the oilwells to prepare the atmosphere for convening the Geneva conference. I gave Nixon to understand with all frankness and clarity that during his visit to Israel he would be exposed to Israeli insistence to end the state of war and I said to him that I was absolutely not prepared to discuss this matter except in one case, that is when we reached the final solution at the Geneva conference. After such a state the state of war could be terminated. But to accept a termination to the state of war at any stage while Israelis occupied parts of the Arab territories would mean that we approved of their continued occupation as proved by our ending of the state of war while they were still present on Arab land. Nixon agreed with me completely on this point.

As to the second point, namely the one connected with the economic situation, Nixon frankly told me that the United States was going through difficult circumstances resulting from inflation and unemployment and that the Arab oil embargo had helped compound these economic difficulties. That is why the United States would be unable to help us directly with a large sum, but it could nudge its friends, such as the FRG and Japan, to contribute to Egypt's economic support. This would of course be in addition to what we were getting from the Arab countries.

As to the third point, which provided that the United States would set up an atomic reactor in Egypt Nixon approved this. In fact, preliminary implementation measures were taken, such as payment for the nuclear fuel, to make the contract valid and binding between us. As to the fourth point, namely the purchase of arms from the United States, Nixon said to me that once the second step of disengagement was completed, the U.S. President would immediately be in a position to obtain the approval of Congress. This was a necessary approval in this connection, and every president had to take into consideration his possibilities and ability to get it. After the disengagement, the overall atmosphere would be conducive for dealing with the arms. I in fact submitted to both Nixon and Kissinger a list of the arms and the quantities required.

It was obvious that Nixon's visit had achieved all its aims. During the visit, agreement was reached on all the points raised in my talks with Nixon and Kissinger.

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Of course this did not find any affirmative response in Israel, which has been living like a child pampered by the United States for a quarter of a century. Nixon submitted the proposal to set up an atomic reactor as promised to the Congress, accompanied by a proposal for an atomic reactor for Israel, which has three atomic reactors. Israel refused to accept the new atomic reactor and **the upshot** was that the proposal to set up our atomic reactor got stalled in Congress because it was linked to an **Israeli** reactor.

This is in addition to the bitter battle, whose warning signs had already begun to loom in the sky between Nixon and the Congress earlier that we had ever **reckoned**. For the sake of the truth and for history, I will say that I had heard from the important U.S. journalists and commentators, such as Walter Cronkite and others who accompanied Nixon on his tour in the Middle East, that Nixon would inevitably have to step down, whether he liked it or not. Despite that, Nixon in his talk with me was extremely reassured about his political future.

One must ask an important and vital question here, which requires an answer. Was it sound for us to deal with Nixon even if we knew he would step down in the near future? Here we must take into consideration as we answer this question that we were dealing not with Nixon, but with the U.S. President. That is we were dealing with the United States through him to maintain contacts with the United States in our hands as long as the opportunity existed **and as long as the cards in this game** and the conflict between the Arabs and Israel in the Middle East were all held by the United States, which is considered the one that can say yes or no to Israel, which depends **on the** United States for everything from a loaf of bread and butter to guns and planes. Even the Israeli budget deficit is considered by the United States as part of the U.S. national commitment.

Thus whether we like it or not and whether we wanted it or not, the key to the entire situation is in the hands of the United States. Nixon was still the U.S. President. How could I stop dealing with him even with the prior knowledge that he would step down in a month or two. Dealing with him would provide an opportunity for continuity, I mean in the sense that if he **stepped** down, I would be able to resume dealing with his successor.

These are the primary principles of courageous strategy which repudiate anyone burying his head in the sand like an ostrich. This reveals to us the devious ways, the one-upmanships games, the hollow quixotic spirit, and other **symptoms of** diseases which afflict certain Arab authorities that have not yet managed to get rid of them. Certain Arabs have been accustomed to feed on **speeches**, statements, announcements, cheers, slogans, placards, and crazy emotionalism, that only further complicate things, instead of resorting to scientific research for a practical solution. The favorite excuse for covering up their inability to face up to reality has become to reject this reality. To reject reality does not even necessarily mean to disavow it, or change it in our favour, since this would entail studies and estimates that have to be made.

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As to the quixotic actions of the Western dark ages, the time for them has gone forever since the October war. It is time for all Arabs to speak the language of the age which is understood by the world. This is the language which dictates that we deal with leaders who can contribute to the solution of our problems. President Nixon undoubtedly was one of these leaders.

On the third day of Nixon's visit, we took a helicopter together from Ra's at-Tin Palace and went to the pyramids in Al-Jizah. It was unthinkable that Nixon should visit Egypt without visiting the pyramids. At the end of this visit and after taking historic pictures there, we went to 'Abidin Palace, and lo and behold, all of Cairo had come out to the last man in another really astounding display.

We were supposed to take a closed car because it was noon and it was hot, but we were compelled to take an open car. When we reached the tunnel to the pyramids we found that Al-Haram Street, although it was a Friday and there should have been few people there, had not an inch to put one's foot on either sides of the streets. If this was true here, what would the situation be like in the town?

We changed from the open car to a closed one at the tunnel. What I had expected happened: The people of Cairo hurried into the streets and to their balconies and windows along the road to Abidin Palace despite the summer heat and the blazing sun at noon. Our enlightened and intelligent people still wanted to affirm to the whole world that we did not follow the Soviets or any others. We are friends of all because we are above and more sublime than any alinement or custodianship.

After a short rest at Abidin Palace, we continued our talks and arrived at the main lines; I repeat, the main lines which were represented in the four points which we had analyzed earlier. Afterwards, we held a press conference at which the joint statement was announced. In the joint statement, U.S. President Nixon pledged long-term aid amounting to 2 billion dollars. The aid was not monetary, but involved facilities that would support the Egyptian economy and Egyptian-U.S. friendship. The joint statement also mentioned a reactor. As for moves to solve the question, the statement mentioned them in general terms because they required discussions and studies which were not within the framework of the statement. The statement mentioned nothing about the fourth point, pertaining to the United States arming the Egyptian Armed Forces, so that Israel could not move against Nixon in the Congress and hamper his mission.

After his 3-day stay in Egypt, Nixon left for Saudi Arabia, where he stayed for 1 day. He then left for Syria, Jordan, and Israel and spent a day in each of these countries. In Israel, Nixon fulfilled his promises. He was not afraid of anything, for he was a strong president in the full meaning of the word. Had he stayed in office to the end of his term, the second disengagement step would have taken place in September or October 1974 at the latest.

When Nixon arrived in Israel, he said in his first speech that the Israelis had to prepare themselves for taking decisions that might be painful for them. He said that with extreme frankness and clarity. This indicates that he was determined to keep his word and his agreement with us and to honor them. At this point, the Zionists were infuriated with Nixon and quickened their pace to get rid of him. After that, Nixon returned to the United States and later visited the Soviet Union.

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When he returned home, the Watergate case had turned into a fever which had swept the entire U.S. society. Zionist hands, no doubt, had played a role in that feverish move, for the Zionists realized that Nixon had begun actually to put pressure on them without any fear of the elections. They considered the joint Egyptian-U.S. statement an alarm heralding substantial changes in the prevailing situation in the Middle East.

Israel was indescribably disturbed, as it had been surprised by the enthusiastic and spontaneous reception with which our people had so astonished Nixon and those accompanying him that Nixon had said that he had never been accorded such a reception. Members of the delegation accompanying him said that such a reception had never occurred in history. All of this prompted the Zionists to get rid of Nixon quickly. It took only a few weeks after Nixon's visit to Egypt and he was out of the White House. One of Israel's aims was also to get rid of Kissinger, who was expected to step down after Nixon, since he was the sole remaining witness to Israel's disgraceful defeat in October 1973. For this reason, he became a target for frenzied campaigns aimed at getting rid of him and appointing a new secretary of state. Another aim was to gain time until the election year came around, which was the reason behind their desperate efforts to abort Kissinger's mission in March 1975.

Continuation of Chapter Three

Cairo MENA in Arabic 2340 GMT 26 Oct 75 JN

[Published by the newspaper AL-AHRAM on 27 October]

[Text] Cairo, 26 October--The newspaper AL-AHRAM continues to publish in its issue for tomorrow, Monday, the third part of President Anwar as-Sadat's memoirs, which deals with the development of Egyptian-American relations after the October 1973 war.

Following is the text of this part of President as-Sadat's memoirs:

Israel no doubt regarded the removal of Nixon, which in appearance took the form of resignation, as if it were a victory for Israel. No one would ask Israel to take a quick step because the new U.S. President would undoubtedly need a chance to study the situation, particularly since President Ford, who succeeded Nixon, was not an elected president but reached the position through appointment by the Congress, and had no profound experience in international affairs because he was a local politician in the first place. Nevertheless, I can say that after meeting with him in Salzburg, I discovered that he is an honest man with straightforward ethics; holds commitment, frankness and honesty sacred; and is not the type of twisted politician in the style of the cowboys, such as Johnson for example. Generally speaking, President Ford puts forward a good image for the United States because of his high ethics and thinking which places America's interests first. The Zionists were again disappointed when they found out that the new U.S. President intended to implement an American national policy and not a racist Zionist policy. Therefore, they began to place obstacles and difficulties in his way, such as foiling the Kissinger mission in March 1975.

The removal of Nixon was the reason for the postponement of the next step in the disengagement in September or October 1974.

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Naturally, we did not call for the convocation of the Geneva conference because the United States was not ready, and because the Arabs had not yet agreed on broadlines and basic points making them a cohesive and united front in encountering Israel's tricks at the conference.

As for the Soviet Union, it was ready at the beginning to attend the conference. The only thing the Soviet Union wanted to do was to stand up and try to outdo others and tell the Arab man in the street that it was the only power defending the Arab nation. The Soviet Union would have reached the limits of exaggeration and radicalism and would have appeared more eager to preserve the interests of the Arab nation, much more than the Arab nation itself, in the Soviet Union's assessment, if it could restore the prestige it had lost in the area as a result of its treatment of Egypt and as a result of its continued proclamation that it would sell us weapons to compensate our losses while at the same time refusing to fulfill its commitments toward us. In other words, the Soviet Union's objective in the conference would be to attenuate the entire Arab position and to make it appear before the world as disunited and weak so that we might return to the Soviet Union again, kneeling and asking for forgiveness and pardon. The greatest evidence of this is the discrimination between Egypt and Syria, as if the Arab cause concerns the Syrian Ba'ath Party and not Egypt.

Whether we like it or not, the United States is the basis of the Geneva conference because it has the key to the situation, while the Soviet Union can only express its support or rejection and denunciation, and all these are valueless weapons in such serious conferences.

We might imagine what the situation would be like if the United States entered the conference with the same all-out support and blind alinement with Israel, as was the case in Johnson's days for example. In such a case, the Geneva conference could last for 20 years without decisive results, because the Soviet Union would extend its verbal support to the Arabs while the United States would extend its material support to Israel.

Israel, on its part, does not respect the United States itself, which gives it everything. Evidence of this is in the Israeli challenge to the United States in March 1975 and rejection of the settlement proposed by Kissinger when Israel felt that Ford and Kissinger did not have sufficient support in Congress to act and impose the settlement on Israel. Israel depended in this on the Congress' alinement with it. Therefore, Israel did not care about U.S. prestige in the world, and made the United States appear as a state which cannot carry out its word. Israel did all this for the sake of gaining time for itself and wasting time for the Arabs. What would the situation have been like in the Geneva conference if the United States had supported Israel blindly? Of course, there would have been no sense in holding the conference, because we would have lost the key to the situation completely. The U.S. stand is the basis, if our moves are to be studied and effective. Therefore, it was necessary to postpone the convocation of the Geneva conference because of the U.S. preoccupation with its internal change and Kissinger's complete preoccupation with defending himself, due to the attack concentrated upon him after Nixon's ouster. Elimination of Kissinger--the only witness of Israel's defeat in October 1973, as I said before, and the appointment of a new secretary of state to begin all over again--would have made time pass without any decisive solution of the Arab issue since 1976 is an election year and we would have to enter 1977 with the situation becoming lukewarm again.

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The Israeli's expected that during the period from 1975 to 1977, the Arab situation would explode from within and consequently, the Arab cohesion resulting from the 1973 October war would fragment. Israel would then be able to deal separately with the Arab states, and the Arab nation would lose its dangerous weapon in the form of oil--the weapon which the United States and Europe frequently take into consideration.

Here, we must not give Israel any opportunity to strike at the situation from within. This can be achieved by preserving the momentum to settle the issue whether on the political or the military level. Therefore, we have reproached the Syrian Ba'th Party because it has given Israel the opportunity to try to strike out against Arab solidarity. The Ba'thist stance was merely for party purposes, which do not rise to the level of the supreme pan-Arab interest. These efforts, however, will not succeed.

Kissinger did not want Israel to take the initiative from him. He therefore sent for Allon in November 1974 in order to maintain the momentum of his strategy in the Middle East.

At the end of Allon's visit, Kissinger left to attend the NATO meetings in Brussels. While in Brussels, Kissinger summoned the U.S. ambassador in Cairo for a report on Allon's visit. Actually, the U.S. ambassador returned in November and informed me about the outcome of his meeting, which was uneventful. The commands in Egypt and I assessed the situation after being informed of this result, and reached a conviction that there were no proposals by Israel, which was in favor of Nixon's resignation and their success in making Kissinger adopt a defensive position. From our viewpoint, all that was conveyed by Allon to Kissinger was that Israel was not ready for any second step before Kissinger's approval of termination of the state of war.

Kissinger confronted Allon with Nixon's negotiations with the Israeli Government and the fact that the subject of termination of the state of war was out of the question on Egypt's part. What then was the reason for raising it again?

The reason for our assessment of the situation was due to the fact that the Israelis felt they were in a position of strength, and that Ford and Kissinger were in a weak position in view of the subjection of Congress to Zionist pressure.

Israel's tricks covered all its agreements with Nixon including the passes and the oil. It retreated from its previous agreement to withdraw from them. Allon expressed a false readiness to discuss the subject with Egypt if we would alleviate the boycott restrictions on Israel, if the Arabs would not resist the restoration of relations between Israel and the African countries, if the Arabs would pave the way for economic exchange between the Arabs and Israel, and in the light of other Israeli altercations in broadcasts attempting to strike at Arab solidarity. The Syrian Ba'th Party believed these altercations. I have previously said that I warned against this during the Rabat summit conference and I told the kings and presidents that relations among us should not be based on the statements from Israeli radio. But the Ba'th Party refused to take this advice for narrow-minded and biased party reasons.

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I summoned Isma'il Fahmi to attend the discussion with the U.S. ambassador, in order to confirm it later in detailed minutes.

The U.S. ambassador spoke to me about all this Israeli nonsense, and added that Israel wanted to guarantee that Bab El Mandeb would not be closed again, although we did not close Bab El Mandeb in the October war because it is an international strait and closing it would be wrong internationally. However, we did announce the area where navigation was prohibited in the Red Sea--the area where we hit the Israeli ship north of Bab El Mandeb. Immediately, navigation stopped in Elat until we allowed its continuation again after the disengagement.

After the U.S. ambassador narrated all these foolish Israeli stories, he hastened to explain that this was what Kissinger received from Israel and that he wanted to be, as he was accustomed to, an honest conveyer of words, although this was not the view of the United States.

I exploded at the U.S. ambassador as I exploded at the Soviet Ambassador on 8 July 1972. Isma'il Fahmi was stunned when he heard my angry words in reply to the U.S. ambassador. I told him Kissinger could not allow himself to listen to such talk and then convey it to me. If Kissinger said that such talk did not represent the U.S. view, but was a manifestation of honesty in mediation between the sides concerned, why then was he telling it to me? Kissinger should have rejected such talk from its very roots and should not have informed me of it at all, as if it had never been said. It would have been more honorable for the United States to inform me that there was nothing in the stand than to tell me those foolish things. I rejected this sick reasoning in full and made the ambassador understand that the United States could favor Israel but not to this extent, which I could not allow.

The face of the U.S. ambassador grew stiff, and after hearing for an hour and a half the explosion of the volcano of my anger, he asked me to convey all that he was hearing from me to the U.S. Government so that a misunderstanding might not happen again.

In fact, the ambassador was very quiet and proved that he is a really good diplomat. He apologized politely by saying that Kissinger's use of a verbal message was intended to convey the situation to me, regardless of whether I would accept the message or not, and that this was Kissinger's interpretation of honesty in mediation.

I expressed my astonishment to the U.S. ambassador who brought me these foolish Israeli requests at a time when we were thinking seriously of attending the Geneva conference to reach a comprehensive settlement. What could we have done in Geneva in the face of these foolish requests, and as long as this message did not represent the U.S. official view? I in turn regarded it as never having happened, and as having heard nothing at all of this foolishness. In other words, the question was closed at this point, that is the U.S. ambassador told me nothing and I heard nothing.

The U.S. ambassador sent an official message to Washington explaining everything that took place between us. The message had a violent impact on both Ford and Kissinger, because it was stronger than what I had told the Soviet ambassador when I terminated the task of the Soviet experts on 8 July 1972.

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Kissinger sent me a reply expressing regret and explained that he only wanted to inform me of all positive and negative aspects, and that this was a method of honesty in mediating between two sides in such a complicated struggle. Kissinger asked me to postpone discussion of the question until Allon visited him again in January 1975, and that he would inform me of anything new in the situation consistent with his practice of frankness with both sides concerned.

Rabin visited the United States in 1974. I thought that Rabin would replace Golda Meir for the second disengagement and that Kissinger would succeed in pursuing the same method as in the first disengagement. In the first disengagement, Kissinger had made a U.S. offer which Israel could not reject, and thus the first disengagement was brought about. But Rabin was much weaker than Meir and his majority in the Knesset did not exceed two or three votes, in addition to the state of disintegration that prevailed over the government and people of Israel.

We managed to export the disruption which we suffered and faced before October 1973 to Israel which still feels it is beneath its dignity to give up conceit, arrogance, dreams of superiority and supremacy and policy of force and suppression in which it lived before October 1973. But at the same time Israel felt that the facts that emerged after October were encroaching upon it like a nightmare, especially because its casualties still constituted a wound in every house in Israel. Israel's fear of peace was turned into complete impotence to make it. All of these factors stood as obstacles and hindrances impeding the second disengagement which Kissinger's attempt in March 1975 failed to achieve.

The Israelis began playing tricks with Kissinger when they asked him to make his trip twice--the first trip in February and the second in March--to bring about the disengagement. This is what actually happened. After meeting with Rabin and Allon, Kissinger told me that he would come to the area to settle the process in two stages, for which he fixed dates in February and March. But I quickly told him that there was no need at all to come twice as long as the matters were specified and the solutions known. It was preferable, therefore, that he settle the process in one visit only, as happened in the first disengagement. My entire letter insisted on this because I saw the first sign of Israeli tricks looming on the horizon, and because Kissinger's coming twice would cause difficulty with traditional Arab outbidders. But Kissinger convinced Ford of his rationale in coming to the area twice. Ford sent a letter asking me to agree with Kissinger's views--that the first tour would be exploratory and the second to ending the matter. I then sent a letter to Ford approving what he asked.

Kissinger came in February on an exploratory trip. I had clearly defined Egypt's aims concerning the passes and oil, and I had affirmed that I was not prepared for any discussion on less than that. I had also affirmed that I would not discuss ending of the state of war. But the Israelis, as usual, wanted the negotiations to enter mazes that would keep them away from their original course. One of these mazes was their insistence on ending the state of war and discussing the situation of the passes and oil. They wanted to divide the passes so that they would obtain one pass and we the other. They also wanted to divide the oilfields, which are situated in the north and south, in the same manner as the passes.

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When Kissinger began his second trip in March, I was in Aswan. The shuttle between Aswan and Israel began, and continued for 17 days. During this period Kissinger did all he could to persuade the two parties to reach a disengagement agreement. After 10 days of shuttling between Aswan and Israel, I told Kissinger that his efforts would result in nothing because the Israelis were not ready or able to make peace and that is why they were resisting any step toward him. But Kissinger was patient and asked me to give him another chance to try to make another effort.

I was frank and clear when I declared that the termination of the state of war would only take place after the final solution in Geneva. Kissinger came to me on the 10th day of the negotiations encouraged because an agreement was imminent in view of the fact that Israel had agreed not to discuss the question of termination of war. However, I did not meet him with the same degree of cheerfulness and optimism. I even told him frankly that their method, which I had learned from him, and the way the negotiations were taking place and other things such as the initiatives and signs, indicated that the attitude of the U.S. President and that of his secretary of state were weak enough that they had failed to make Israel abide by its agreements with the U.S. Government.

I explained to Kissinger that the Israeli policy which is based on tricks, procrastination and postponement is basically aimed at getting rid of him in order to gain time until the U.S. elections in 1976. I also told him that the Israeli Government is a weak one, incapable of making peace, and that the Israeli people themselves are afraid of making peace. Therefore there was no hope from Kissinger's efforts in this regard.

Kissinger, however, insisted on his optimism and asserted that since Israel had disregarded the termination of war, there was great hope for completing the agreement. But I said to Kissinger, in the presence of Isma'il Fahmi and Al-Jamasi and in front of all those who were present, that it was impossible to conclude the agreement during this visit because Israel had not yet reached this stage, whether on the official or popular level.

In fact, Kissinger left for Israel and returned empty-handed. He brought with him the definition of the lines to be mapped for withdrawal from the passes and oilfields. He did not tell me anything about the map he brought with him. Instead, he said the Israelis had refused to define any line on the basis that they wanted to keep a monitor in one of the passes. They also did not want the line to remain straight in certain areas, and wanted us to reach the oilfields via the east by passing through Israeli occupied territory.

At that time, I told Kissinger that my talks with him were in accordance with a study and knowledge of the complicated Israeli psyche. It was clear that his disappointment was great and cannot be described.

Although I do respect Kissinger's feelings, I asked him immediately to study the possibilities of the next stage in view of his mission's failure. I had explained to him that the failure of his mission would be a result of Israeli procrastination, tricks and bad intentions and absolutely not because of us.

Kissinger admitted my flexibility, more than he expected, toward the Israeli insistence.

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He then asked me before the end of the last trip to Israel if he should return after the final failure of his mission, or if he should go straight to the United States. I told him that he should leave for the United States directly.

Kissinger left for Tel Aviv where he spent 2 or 3 days. A telegram arrived at 2200 saying that a statement on the failure of Kissinger's mission would be broadcast at 2300. This was a surprise to us.

At that time, Isma'il Fahmi was at the Cataract Hotel and I was at my resthouse in Aswan. I immediately asked Isma'il Fahmi to release via the radio at 2300--at the time of the Israeli broadcast--the failure of Kissinger's mission and the collapse of the U.S. policy based on a step-by-step withdrawal, in view of Israel's intransigence and tricks.

Our announcement made the cabinet and public opinion in Israel furious with Rabin because we were 14 hours ahead of the Israelis with the report, and because the world took the report from our broadcasting station, whereas Rabin was compelled to hold a press conference 14 hours later to announce what the world already knew.

The newspaper will continue to publish the third part of President as-Sadat's memoirs in its issue the day after tomorrow, Tuesday.

Further Continuation of Chapter Three

Cairo MENA in Arabic 0334 GMT 28 Oct 75 JN

[Published by AL-AHRAM on 28 October]

[Text] Cairo, 27 October--The newspaper AL-AHRAM continues to publish in its issue for tomorrow, Tuesday, the last part of President Anwar as-Sadat's memoirs on the development of Egyptian-American relations after the October war of 1973. The text of the memoirs follows:

After this, the Israelis thought that the move toward peace had lost the necessary impetus, and they were somehow reassured. However, our vigilance made it incumbent on us not to let the reins of initiative slip from our hands.

Perhaps this was the reason behind my meeting with President Ford in Salzburg on 1 June 1975. The meeting began with my giving a luncheon banquet for President Ford at the ancient fort of (Fotshil Schloss) in which I was staying--which [words indistinct] where the beauty of the creator surrounds it from every side. President Ford attended the luncheon and delivered his address. It was the first time I met him.

President Ford is one of the world leaders with whom one feels at ease from the very first meeting. This is due to the qualities of simplicity, frankness and geniality which appear on his face and in his manner. I had seen a film on the first meeting between President Ford and Congress members after his assumption of his duties as President. I understood from the film that everything about him speaks of truth, frankness and clarity in his words, appearance or behavior.

When I met him in person, the idea I had formed from the film was confirmed. The most important point which President Ford concentrated on in the speech he delivered during the luncheon was that America would not allow the situation to become a stalemate again.

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My answer to his statement was that the time has come for clear decisions to be adopted, and that America did not need us to repeat that all the papers are in its hands, that it is the main source of life for Israel be it in peace or war, and that it is the only state in the world which can decisively influence Israel. Decisive influence must necessarily have a clear decision, which must be taken by America to preserve its huge international weight in the Middle Eastern area. In the afternoon we went to the palace where the discussions were to be held. The American delegation was composed of President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco. I was at the head of the Egyptian delegation which was composed of Vice President Muhammad Husni Mubarak, and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Isma'il Fahmi. The first session began dealing with the problem promptly.

President Ford asked me to explain my point of view to him. I explained the main points to him represented in the fact that the key to the entire situation is in America's hand because Israel has no standing or entity without America. Despite this, it is extremely anomalous that Israel should work at striking America's policy in the area--a policy which is aimed at not freezing the situation in the area in order to reach a solution based on justice. Israel is working to distort America's face by frustrating the step-by-step policy. This policy is primarily aimed at keeping the situation continuously moving in order to avoid a stalemate. It is the same policy which the Soviet Union is working hard to attack, frustrate and ridicule. The Soviet Union is attempting to incite those who revolve in its orbit in the Arab world to strike at Arab solidarity. In this, Israel would be in alliance with the Soviet Union against the United States.

At the end of my analyses of the situation, I mentioned that I had told Kissinger during his step-by-step discussions that his policy would not succeed because it was clear that Israel was exploiting the current dispute between the American Congress and government in order to penetrate through this dispute to get rid of Kissinger, gain time and come to the elections of 1976--a year in which American policy is incapable of moving or taking decisions. By then 1977 would follow in the hope that the Arab stand would have become dismembered. Israel believes that the Arabs are emotional. Therefore, the Israeli policy always considers that the Arabs are incapable of cohesion for a long time. It is awaiting dismemberment sooner or later and that is why it was very keen on gaining time as much as possible.

On the other hand, I stressed in my discussions with Ford that Israel is afraid of peace and cannot make peace. It had for some 26 or 27 years played the tune of peace until the world came to believe that it was a meek, peace-loving country and that it was its misfortune to have fallen into a forest of struggling animals. The Arabs helped Israel to form this ugly picture to the world because of their insistence on rejecting any positive step to win the world to the side of their just issue. They thus left the arena free for Israel to do what it wished. That is why Israel became a symbol of peace, civilization and progress while the Arabs became a symbol of war, backwardness, destruction and reaction despite the fact that theirs was a just cause.

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Israel has succeeded in benumbing the world with dreams of peace and with assertions that all it hopes for in the world is the establishment of peace between it and the Arabs. When an Arab president capable of signing a peace agreement appeared, Israel was in a predicament because the most important weapon it had used to win over world opinion to its side was wrested from its hand. I did not announce my readiness to sign a peace treaty after the battle in 1973 only, but I made the same announcement in 1971. Where has Israel's tune gone of the hope of a distant peace which has become near?

Israel is afraid of peace. It does not love nor is it capable of making peace because it is a state built on war and aggression. It lives either in actual war or in the hope of a coming war. All the war and peace aid it gets is the result of the lies it spreads everywhere claiming that the Arabs are threatening its entity, while facts prove that it is Israel that threatens the entire Arab entity from time to time. This is proved by the fact that Israel has increased its area several times while the Arabs were always losing.

I explained to Ford that Israel does not have a strong government capable of achieving peace or even moving toward peace. The government of Rabin has a very weak leadership. Rabin is incapable of telling his people frankly about the facts of the situation. At the same time, the Israeli people themselves are living in the same conditions of fragmentation, division and aimlessness we experienced in Egypt and the entire Arab world before the battle of October 1973. Everyone in Israel is still holding on to the time-worn security theory which advocates imposing reconciliation on the Arabs by force, arms superiority, air supremacy, and all the factors conducive to a continuous and complete Arab surrender.

After I completed my analysis of the situation, I told Ford frankly that he was before a test, and that we hoped he would pass it successfully, and that his stand would resemble to a great extent the stand of President Eisenhower in 1956 when Israel, in collusion with Britain and France, attacked Egypt on 31 October, only 1 week before the beginning of the U.S. elections, on the assumption that the U.S. President would be preoccupied with the elections and incapable of making any decisive stand against the aggression. However, Eisenhower was an honest leader and stood very firmly and made his decisive stand. His decision was not against Israel only but was also against Britain and France as well. Nevertheless, he won the elections ignoring the votes of the American Jews. Then the issue needed courage and daring, and all that was required was to take a decisive stand to be crowned by a decisive decision.

Ford commented on my statement by expressing full conviction that the situation would not be frozen regardless of the effort needed, so that the momentum toward the peace process could continue. He suggested that the United States embark on another attempt on the step-by-step approach. I agreed after we analyzed the situation in full from the viewpoint of continuing the momentum. He stated that he had actually reached this conviction.

At that point Kissinger intervened, inquiring about the point where the negotiations stopped in the past phase. We had stopped at two points:

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1. The duration of the usefulness of the agreement.
2. The early monitoring system which Israel intended to place on the straits to expose all movements on our front.

As for the first point, the Israelis demanded that the duration of the agreement be from 3 to 5 years. Of course we rejected this condition, which was discussed during the negotiations with Kissinger in March 1975. I defined my stand that it would suffice for me to say one word, namely that I was prepared to renew the mandate of the UN Emergency Forces annually instead of once each 6 months, and that I could not promise more than this on the point of the duration of the usefulness of the agreement. I would renew annually on the basis that the peace process continued and progressed. It was unreasonable for me to renew it every year if the peace process was stagnated and at a standstill. In other words, we could not separate the conditions of renewal and duration and the condition of progress in the peace process. I gave my word to President Ford to take into consideration in my calculations the election year.

As for the second point, which revolves about the early monitoring system which exposes our movements and the question of the Israelis' staying in one of the straits, the Israelis were showing their preparedness to evacuate the straits provided that they left this system in its location. But I refused this offer. At that point Kissinger said that since we stopped at these two points in the previous negotiations, was there hope of a new move by Egypt enabling the U.S. President to present it to Israel, and to enter into a new round of the step-by-step diplomacy despite the fact that Israel was taking advantage of the current difference between the Congress and the administration?

I immediately realized the reason which prompted Kissinger to make such a request. When Kissinger's mission failed and he asked for a meeting between me and President Ford in Salzburg, the significance of this step was that President Ford had decided to enter the field personally and with his weight as the President of the United States with the aim of reaching a solution to the problem.

Of course, the ideal solution is to reach a final settlement of the problem. However, because of the circumstances involved in the American domestic situation after Watergate and the Congress' stand toward the U.S. President, the available thing was an attempt at step-by-step diplomacy. These were the forwarded solutions, whether as regards the reassessment of the U.S. policy by the United States or by the Egyptian working group which is working with me on this issue.

Thus came Kissinger's inquiry about the possibility of a new Egyptian move constituting a springboard for Ford. Meanwhile, this move would become a weapon by which Ford could face the Zionist pressure groups in the House of Representatives and the Senate and in all sensitive political positions in the United States, particularly since we agreed that what was possible at this phase was the step-by-step diplomacy again, for the sake of reaching a final settlement which would take place in Geneva in the presence of all sides concerned and after the U.S. position had been consolidated.

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Evidence of the presence of these Zionist pressures is that before Mr. Ford left Washington en route to Salzburg, 76 U.S. senators signed a document calling on the U.S. President to give all kinds of modern weapons and economic and material assistance to Israel because Israel's superiority was the only guarantee for the stability of the area. However, Ford drew my attention that this question should not preoccupy us from continuing our work because this is the way of Congresses, in which he worked for so long. He added that I also had worked as speaker of the People's Assembly in Egypt and therefore we both knew this old parliamentary tradition which does not prevent any deputy in the Assembly from writing a document and soliciting signatures of his colleagues, and most members do not examine the document closely and sign promptly. According to our calculations in the Egyptian working group, the real number of senators fully sympathetic to Israel was not more than 22 out of a total of 76 senators, who signed the document routinely taking into consideration the Zionist influence in their electoral constituencies. We learned later from our embassy in Washington that some of those who signed the document telephoned President Ford after that and told him that their signatures did not mean that they reject peace, but their only aim is to preserve Israel's entity.

I did not ask the U.S. President about this.

However, in order for President Ford to rise above all local considerations and domestic disputes, he needed a new weapon in his hands to face the pressure groups everywhere. This was Kissinger's view so that the issue might enter a new phase. However, I emphasized that I did not have a new offer on the first point, namely, the duration of the usefulness of the agreement, and that I still upheld my word to the effect that in case they withdrew from the straits and the oilfields, I would extend the duration of the UN Emergency Forces every year instead of every 6 months.

At that point Kissinger said that Israel was afraid that the Soviet Union might use the veto against the stay of the UN Emergency Forces in order to create trouble, because the Soviet Union would have no role in this step if it took place, or that the Soviet Union might object in the Security Council against the presence of the UN Emergency Forces. So what would the situation be like then? I told Kissinger that this would not affect the situation in any way as far as I was concerned, as long as I approved the presence of the emergency forces on my land in order to keep the momentum of the peace process. Furthermore, when I personally want to terminate the stay of the UN Emergency Forces, I will do this promptly without needing a resolution from the Security Council or a veto from the Soviet Union. Thus this was not a problem at all, because the question is one of intentions and not mere formal measures.

We had implemented all our undertakings in terms of pledges, and the Americans knew well that it was Israel which always violated its commitments because it depended on being treated as a pet by the Americans themselves.

Therefore, my view of the solution to the problem was that the United States should be a guarantor between us and Israel, particularly since the Americans know us well and have confidence in our word. We also have confidence in the sincere efforts exerted by Kissinger since our first meeting in November 1973, immediately following the war, to establish peace based on justice. It is time now for Israel to trust the Americans.

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Despite all that Israel is obtaining from the United States, which saved it and kept it on its feet during war or peace, Israel still has no confidence in any other state. This is the main characteristic of the behavior of the Jews throughout the centuries. They cast doubt on everyone. As a result of this eternal doubt, they have been refusing to meet with people or mix with them throughout the ages. They isolated themselves in [word indistinct] and quarters in most of the cities.

On my part, I made 4 demands to complete this movement. They were:

1. That a disengagement should take place on the Syrian front;
2. That I should obtain a U.S. guarantee that Israel would not launch an aggression against Syria;
3. That the Palestinians should participate in the settlement at the Geneva conference;
4. That the Geneva conference should convene following the completion of a disengagement on the two fronts.

Regarding U.S. participation in solving the problem, I wanted them to be witnesses to what is taking place between us and Israel in order to judge who is lying and who is honoring his pledges. The issue cannot bear any more tricks.

Regarding the second point pertaining to the early warning system, the (monitor), this was discussed during the last session of talks the next day. I stressed that the United States should enter with all its weight in the issue by presenting a U.S. offer which would determine the stands of those who accept it and who reject it. Consequently, Israel's tricks would be changed to commitment before the superpower which grants it everything. There is a similar precedence in the first disengagement. When this disengagement was about to collapse, I asked Kissinger to present a U.S. offer to both Egypt and Israel. Israel was full of the collapsed grandeur complex and of the dreams of supremacy which had disappeared in front of the glorious October. Israel became incapable of taking any decision. But when Kissinger presented the U.S. offer, the two sides accepted it. It is difficult for Israel to turn down an offer presented by a state without whose help Israel would have no life.

However, with the intervention of the United States with all its weight, and in view of the fact that the United States moved from the position of the enemy to the position of neutral witness, I asked it to build an early warning system similar to the one it built for Israel in order for us to detect Israeli movements.

This apparatus is the most sophisticated invention in the electronic age because it not only detects military movements, but also jams radar, radio, missile batteries and all war equipment using radar and radio.

I knew that the Soviet Union possessed this apparatus, and I also knew that I would not get it if I asked for it. I have told the people about the primitive equipment we had. But the Soviets refused to allow Egyptians to work on them and they took them after the decision to expel the experts. They also refused to sell them to us although I asked to buy them more than once. Their pretext was that they were being tested, despite the fact that they were ordinary and primitive.

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They have more sophisticated things. Regarding the United States, I can reach a decision with it and with U.S. policy which is generally not satisfied with half solutions.

I did not object to keeping the Israeli warning system provided that I obtained a similar one and provided that the two systems be supervised by U.S. civilians, namely witnesses to Israel's movements and my movement on the front to prevent any lies, allegations or tricks in the future.

At this juncture, I realized that President Ford is a politician of the first class and not a hesitating president lacking experience and a long arm. He was smoking a pipe like me. Through the smoke, President Ford indicated to Kissinger that "this operation might be a key to solving the situation." This meant that it would be approved by all parties concerned. Kissinger was astonished at this surprise but I added that keeping the forces was nothing compared to the new Egyptian proposal from which I aimed at obtaining such a system. This system is considered a big addition to our armed forces. I also aimed at not continuing to have my sons in the armed forces obtain information on the enemy through backward means, particularly since the Soviet Union refused to make reconnaissance trips for us with the Foxbat. The Soviet Union withdrew these planes recently, as I declared to the people.

Kissinger did not relinquish his cunning. He asked me about the source from which I would obtain the early warning apparatus. I answered simply that I would purchase it from the United States itself. Just as they sent this apparatus to the Israelis as friends, we demanded this apparatus under the same conditions because we are friends to the Americans, but not as a grant, because we wanted to purchase it. Egyptians would operate it. In this, we would enter the age of sophisticated technology and my sons in the armed forces would obtain the highest degree of science.

In fact, this proposition was admired by President Ford and he agreed to sell me this apparatus with all its expensive technology at a price of more than 100 million dollars.

Regarding the economic aspect, I explained to the Americans that the sum required to support our economy was not 1.5 billion dollars as they imagined, but 1.5 billion pounds sterling. I would obtain half the amount from the Arabs on long-term loans with small interest. The loans would be exempt from interest for the first 4 or 5 years, after which I would start repaying as and when our economy stands on its own feet and when it starts and surges forward.

Regarding charities, I categorically reject them as a matter of principle. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi are prepared to lend me more than half the amount. As regards the United States, I know that it cannot help with more than 500 million dollars, as I learned from the U.S. President before. The 500 million dollars will be given on the basis of 250 million dollars to the fund and 250 million dollars in ordinary aid similar to what we obtained in 1974.

I asked Ford to try to get the other half on long-term loans from his allies. President Ford accepted this.

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Thus the Salzburg meeting was extremely fruitful and constructive. It was not confined to preliminaries and introductions but went beyond that stage to a stage of harmony on several viewpoints. This gave new dimensions to Egyptian-U.S. relations. These relations had returned to normal thanks to the October war and the good offices and praiseworthy efforts Kissinger exerted during the first disengagement.

I believe that the most important thing we got out of the Salzburg meeting--as I told Husni Mubarak and Isma'il Fahmi--was the friendship which grew between us and Ford. Even had nothing been accomplished concerning the points discussed, merely keeping the United States on our side is a big gain in itself. That is why I drew the U.S. President's attention to this and expressed my insistence on the first option which included on the United States' part an overall picture of and a complete solution to the Middle East problem, particularly since the U.S. stand on the side of the Arab right in Geneva will entirely change the situation and will get the problem finally moving along the course to a solution. But if Israel succeeds in making the United States align itself with it, this will mean that the problem will stagnate indefinitely, that is, if it does not become more complex and unsolvable so that no power in the world will come close to it.

As in the first disengagement agreement with the United States, I decided to deal with the root and not the branch. The United States holds the key to the entire situation while Israel consists of peripheral mazes and deadends. But certain Arabs are playing the game of oneupmanship out of hypocrisy and ill intentions, while others are behaving out of crazy and narrow-minded emotionalism and inability to grasp the changes of the age. That is why they do not understand my insistence on cooperation with the United States which holds the key to the entire situation and the cards of the game or issue in the Middle East, whether or not we like it or accept it. If step-by-step fails, we can still go to Geneva without suspicion or fear of the U.S. stand. Thus we will prevent the polarization and stagnation which result from the condition in which the United States completely aligns itself with Israel and the Soviet Union stands on the side of the Arabs with its well known method.

My desire was therefore that the United States remain neutral, to the extent permitted by U.S. conditions, between us and Israel if we cannot make it stand on our side. A U.S. view which is objective and not blindly aligned, as was the case before and after 1967, will be a big gain in itself in any stage whether or not Kissinger succeeds in the step-by-step policy and whether or not the Geneva conference succeeds. We must deal with our problem and solve it since God has given us brains for thinking and the willpower to continue, and free decisions that we can make without fear from anyone. We know our own good and the decision it requires.

The United States knows full well that we have finally emerged from the predicament in which we have been since 1967. After October 1973, we exported the entire predicament to Israel which has been facing a new predicament in every step it takes and to whom withdrawal has become an inevitable necessity whether it refuses the step-by-step policy--as it did when it embarrassed the United States in March 1975--or refuses the Geneva conference. Every such refusal will consolidate the predicament from which Israel fails to emerge. As for me, my nerves are completely calm and my thinking is quite free from emotionalism and anger. My actions are calculated and considered while my decisions are free and completely controlled by me. Each step taken in the future will be for the good of my country as long as we have complete vigilance concerning all Israel's maneuvers and tricks.

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This, I am sorry to say, is not understood by the Arab outbidders, or rather this is what they do not want to understand. Nevertheless, only what is correct will be right. This is proven by the fact that I won the friendship of the U.S. President, in addition to the ground we gained among the U.S. people to the extent that when Israel caused Kissinger's mission to fail, an opinion poll was taken among the U.S. people. The outcome of this poll was that 50 percent of the U.S. public was aware of my stand completely although the opposite was expected because of the Zionist control over the means for gauging public opinion and the information and propaganda media. It suffices for the United States to realize that Israel does not care about the international weight of U.S. policy in the area, and even distorts the picture by portraying the United States as incapable of making a conclusive decision. This is angering the United States, particularly in confronting the Soviet Union.

Thus the White House has become a friendly house for the first time in 20 years of tense, deteriorating, and severed Egyptian-U.S. relations. The road to the White House was not paved with roses but mined with thorns and explosives. For the sake of truth and for history, the White House proved its good intentions through its good offices and praiseworthy efforts to remove the thorns and mines. It has always kept its word out of respect for its standing in the world. It was natural that this good spirit, these good offices, and praiseworthy efforts should meet with every welcome on our part. Thus the road to the White House became a safe one after the Egyptian and U.S. parties cleared it of all the gangsters whom Israel had been fond of sending out from time to time and of deploying on both sides of the road to destroy every possibility of a meeting between Egypt and the United States.

As I said, my first contact with the U.S. President after I was elected Egyptian president, that is my first contact with the White House, was on 24 December 1970, 2 months after my assumption of office. At that time I said among other things in a message I sent to President Nixon that every action you take will have a counter-action on our side, if it is good then we will take a good step toward you, and if it is bad we will return it. The White House made steps for the good after the glorious October. Our reply will be by visiting the White House fully confident of ourselves and in a step for more good. This is immortal Arab Egypt--authenticity, soundness and faith.

AL-AHRAM says this is what has been released for publication from the memoirs of President Anwar as-Sadat.

MENA REPORTS AS-SADAT INTERVIEW ON ABC

Cairo MENA in English 0930 GMT 27 Oct 75 ID

[Text] Washington, Oct 27 (MENA)--In an interview with the ABC news "Issues and Answers", President as-Sadat said that he had agreed with U.S. President Ford in Salzburg that if a second disengagement agreement can be achieved, he would then ask for arms. More than that, when I met most of the committee of the armed forces in the Congress, I told them the same thing because I am in a very peculiar position, President as-Sadat said.

After the war, I mean after the cease-fire, which was on the 22d of October and up until this moment I have not replaced any piece of arms that I lost in the war while Israel has replaced every arm it lost by the United States, and Syria over-replaced the arms it lost and arms were replaced before the ceasefire on the 22d of October.

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Up until this moment I did not replace any piece of arms. For that I asked President Ford and according to my decision of diversifying the sources of arms, to help me. But we did not discuss figures, we discussed the principle only.

Answering a question whether President Ford or Secretary of State Kissinger indicated they would respond to a request for long-term military aid, President as-Sadat said they must put this before the Congress quite frankly. "On the other hand, as I told you, we did not discuss any figure or any length of time at all, we only discussed the principle," he remarked.

President as-Sadat said he will be seeking arms from all over the world if the United States does not agree to provide him. "I shall be seeking arms from Western Europe, and from the Soviet Union if they agree, but, as it is now between us, I do not think they will agree to more provisions."

Answering a query if it is reasonable that he could ever match any American arms commitment to the Israelis without depending very heavily on the Soviet Union, President as-Sadat asserted that it is a true fact that more than 90 per cent of his arms now are Soviet arms. But, he said, "for 14 months after the ceasefire they did not send me anything except last January 1975 when they sent me some of the contracts that had been due in '73 and '74 and even did not come in the airlift. They did not provide it completely, they provided part of it and stopped." If the Soviet Union is not going to provide me with anything, am I to stand with folded arms? No, not at all, he remarked.

Question: Is it your intention here to really speak about an escalating arms race, or is it your intention to try to convince the Americans to scale down their military commitment to Israel?

Answer: This is right, quite right. This will be the proper solution to the whole thing.

Question: Do you believe that Israel has nuclear weapons?

Answer: I know that, especially after they had the "Morar" reactor from France since a very long time. I know that they are working in this field. I cannot say I am sure, but it is a great possibility that they have.

Question: Do you think that any new confrontation, should it happen in the Middle East, could involve nuclear weapons?

Answer: Well, from our side, I stated my position. I said I am not going to use the atomic weapons in any war except as a retaliation.

Question: We would like to know what you want specifically from the United States. There are a lot of reports that say you want F-16 fighters, you want an early warning defense system, you want defensive missiles, you need specific aid to assist a difficult economy in your country. Can you be specific as to what contribution you think America should make to Egypt in view of the fact that you have signed the second stage agreement?

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Answer: As I told you before, it was not a condition for me to sign the second disengagement agreement, to have so and so and so at all. If this agreement was not agreeable to us or agreeable to our national aspiration, we wouldn't have agreed to it. Like we have done last March. But I am going to discuss with President Ford, I shall be meeting your congressmen and your senators, I shall be asking for helping me in putting my decision of diversifying the sources of arms in action from America. It has already been put in action through France and Britain. I hope that I can reach the state that the United States agreed to provide me with arms, to sell me arms. I am not asking arms, I mean, as a grant or with no price no, I am asking to buy the arms.

Question: Do you mean that literally, Mr. President, that you are not asking for any American arms aid as a grant, that you are perfectly willing to purchase whatever you need?

Answer: I shall be asking to purchase arms from the United States.

Question: As you know, Mr. President, the American Congress is not in a very generous mood these days. Foreign aid of all sorts is under special pressure, partly because of the plight of American cities such as New York who have their own serious financial problems. Wouldn't this have very serious effect on your problem of the aid that you do need for economic purposes or whatever?

Answer: Well, as I told you, I am not going to the United States as a beggar.

Question: But you are certainly going to ask for some aid?

Answer: I am going to ask for some aid, sure, but I am going to ask for the aid you can give. I am not putting, or pointing to a certain amount of so and so. Not at all. Mainly, I want you to help me on the economic side, to have long-term loans because the difficulty in my economy is that we have short-term loans, some of which the interest reaches more than 22 per cent. This is what causes the trouble for my economy here. If I can have long-term loans with some grace period, well, I shall be in a very good condition. If you can give, it is okay for me. Then we have our assets here. We have the Suez Canal. We have our oil. We have our industry. We have (our future). We are not a country without assets.

Question: What pledges were made by the United States at the time of the second stage disengagement agreement and how are these being fulfilled? Do you feel there are still things that the United States implicitly promised to get and they have not delivered yet?

Answer: Well, as I told you, I didn't sign this disengagement agreement on condition that the United States will do so and so and so at all. Not at all. As I told you, it goes with my national aspiration. I signed it. But, I am going to visit the United States to put our relations in its proper position. This means that economically and on the arms problem that I am facing to defend my country and culturally and in every field, we are going to seek to put our relations in proper position.

Question: Do you have a commitment from the United States that the U.S. will work effectively to disengagement, for example on the Golan front between Israel and Syria. Do you consider that to be a commitment from America?

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Answer: Yes, I have asked President Ford just like the first disengagement. I have asked for this and it has been fulfilled after that a disengagement on the Golan Heights in the first stage. [as received] I have asked this in the second stage also and I feel that the United States will be fulfilling its obligations in this because it is the only party that can do this for Syria.

Question: Mr President, do you feel that the assurances given you by President Ford account to an obligation to apply pressure on Israel to get a withdrawal from the Golan Heights?

Answer: Well, if you consider the obligation that has already been fulfilled in the first disengagement agreement, as you say, the second will be exactly the same.

Question: Because of assurances you have received from President Ford. You trust those assurances, is that what you are saying?

Answer: Sure I trust the man, and I like him very much. Really, he is an honest and straightforward man. With Dr. Kissinger, I have stated, and I repeat it again, he has never failed his word with me up until this moment.

Question: Just how bad is the state of relations between Egypt and Syria at the moment?

President Sadat: There is a hobby for the Soviet Union to try and make contradictions between the regimes in the Arab world. They have done it between Iraq and Nasir, as between Qasim and Nasir. They have done it between Salah Jaddid who was before Asad, again with Nasir also. And they are doing the same game now between Asad and me. But I shall not answer and, as I told you it is something inside the Arab family which we can deal with.

Question: I think you are quoted as accusing Syria of dealing in mischievous propaganda, harboring ulterior motives. What are these motives, these ulterior motives?

Answer: The problem with Syria is the Ba'th Party. It is a pure party intrigue, and they are accustomed to this, as I told you before. With Nasir they have done it. With me they are doing it now, and after that as the Ba'th Party will be in power, he will [as received] do this same intrigue. This is their way.

Question: Mr President, if you have no problems with Syria, why did you recently pull the remaining units of the Egyptian Air Force out of Syria?

Answer: Well, I will tell you the story of this. Before the war we sent a squadron of 12 airplanes there with 12 pilots. They fought the battle with the Syrians in 1973 and we lost 2 killed and 4 injured. We replaced the pilots, but we couldn't replace the planes because, as I told you, I didn't have any replacement from the Soviet Union for my casualties that I lost in the war. Lately, in our feast of Ramadan, the base in which my pilots are stationed, was visited by the commander-in-chief of the air force and the assistant secretary general of the Ba'th Party and they abused Egypt, the Egyptians, abused me, abused the leadership because of our second disengagement agreement.

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When I received this report, I said, very well, we must withdraw our people, not to create any problem.

Question: In the event of a new Middle East war, would you again send Egyptian planes to help Syria?

Answer: As I stated, if Israel attacks Syria, I have my commitments. I must help Syria. I have my commitments. It is not only for Syria, but my commitments as Egypt in the Arab world with its position and its role in the history of the area.

Question: What do you see is going to happen in the Middle East? Will there be a Geneva conference? Is that the next step? Disengagement on the Golan Heights? What do you see as happening in the Middle East in the months ahead?

Answer: I think a second disengagement should take place on the Golan Heights and that after that we go all of us to Geneva. And I have declared that.

Let us make the year 1976 the year of Palestine. I mean that we shall do our best to bring the Palestinians with us in Geneva. While I am visiting the States, I shall be putting my position more clearly than this in my speech in the United Nations and with a specific step that I am going to ask.

Question: Would you share with us the specifics of the suggestion you mean to make about having the Palestinians participate?

Answer: Well, I shall be discussing the whole vision of the problem with President Ford before I am going to put my proposition.

Question: Are you happy, Mr. President, with the current role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East? Do you think the Russians are sincerely trying to work toward peace in the Middle East?

Answer: I am awfully sorry to tell you that I am having lots of trouble and misunderstandings with them and I can't understand their position. For that I can't say what is their position, but from what I see--take, for instance, the example of the second disengagement agreement. It was not supposed that we were going to sign it in Geneva. We would have signed it here under the auspices of the United Nations in the zone between the two forces. But I went to Geneva just to give the Soviet Union an opportunity to share in the whole agreement, but they refused. Well, I can't understand their attitude.

Question: And you have said eventually the peace negotiations after a disengagement on the Golan Heights should move to the Geneva conference. The United States and the Soviet Union, of course, are co-sponsors of that conference. With your pessimistic view of what the Russians are doing now, wouldn't that be a not very happy portent for the success of a Geneva conference?

Answer: I am leaving this for Syria to decide. In the first disengagement Dr. Kissinger had achieved this agreement for the Syrians, I am leaving it. Either the Syrians agree that Dr. Kissinger achieve this agreement for them, the second one. It is for the Syrians to decide. But I am not really very optimistic about the output of the Soviet position.

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EGYPT

Question: What is your view of a next disengagement of the Golan Heights?

Answer: It should have taken place after our agreement had been achieved, but I don't know what is happening there in Syria and what is happening between Syria and the United States and between Syria and the Soviet Union.

Question: Does it need to be done in 3 months, or 6 months, or can it wait a year and if it doesn't happen within those periods of time, does the whole Middle East run into danger of erupting again?

Answer: Well, in our second disengagement agreement you can see that I have given the Israelis 5 months to fulfill the agreement. It shouldn't have been five months because it could have been achieved in 2 months or so.

Question: Mr. President, there seems, as seen from the United States, to be no end to the present violence in Lebanon. I wonder if you would comment on what you think is the root of the problem there and whether or not you see any solution?

Answer: Well, frankly, I must tell you that I am very deeply concerned about what is happening there in Lebanon, terror, killing and kidnaping. I don't know really. And I know the Lebanese. It was said that they are the most civilized nation in the Arab world. But why this should happen, I don't know, really.

In my last speech I said, 'Get off with all your hands. Off Lebanon,' for my Arab colleagues and for any foreign power that wants to create trouble. The situation in Lebanon has two aspects. One aspect, it is between the Lebanese themselves. They should sit together and find the way for themselves. And in this every guardianship should be raised off the Palestinians and off the Lebanese.

Question: Does it have wider dangers, Mr. President? Could it, were it to continue, lead to wider conflict in the Middle East?

Answer: Sure. Certainly. And in my speech in the parliament I have stated that we might be facing a situation that is dangerous, like the situation that we faced in 1948.

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J O R D A N

F 1

UN REPRESENTATIVE SPEAKS ON PALESTINIANS

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 5 Nov 75 P 1 JN

[Text] Amman, (JNA)--The Jordan permanent representative to the United Nations, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, addressed the UN General Assembly on the subject of the Palestinian problem saying that the Palestinian problem now differs in scope and circumstance from the past due to its world wide acclaim.

The Palestinian rights, he added, have received an international recognition and have been considered the bases for peace in the Middle East.

Mr Sharaf continued: "Ever since the year 1948 until this date, the General Assembly was discussing the consequences of this unique historical problem and the representatives of this body have been imprisoned by misinterpretation and distortion of this problem and never have tried to understand the roots of it as a problem of rights, and have overlooked the fact that the Palestinians were a people of distinct personality and existence."

Only last year when Resolution 3236 was issued giving the Palestinians the right for self determination without outside interference, only then, there was a substantial change in the outlook of the world body members towards the Palestinian problem.

For the past 20 years the UN has been calling on Israel to allow the Palestinian refugees to exercise their rights for repatriation, but with no avail. This is because Israel is governed by a racist and chauvinist military mentality and therefore has closed its eyes to the rights of the Palestinians for the past three decades.

In addition to the Israeli obstinacy, the Zionist movement built a mental and psychological barrier against the West in order not to bring to light the obvious rights of the Palestinians and the bankrupt morality of the Israeli position.

Mr Sharaf rejected the Israeli argument which he said tried to "confuse Jordan with Palestine in an attempt to obliterate the genuine and established rights of the Palestinians in the Palestinian land and on Palestinian soil, and the attempt to distant and reduce, [as published] the Palestine question and to turn it into a question between Jordan and Israel."

Mr Sharaf concluded his address to the UN General Assembly saying "If the world body would focus its efforts to solve this problem in a responsible manner and in accordance with Palestinian rights and their realities, the solution would be at hand and permanent peace in the Middle East would be a reality and not a far-fetched dream."

PAPER COMMENTS ON ISRAELI ACTIONS ON WEST BANK

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 3 Nov 75 P 2 JN

[Editorial: "The Bell Tolls"]

[Text] This time it is tolling, loud and clear, with a call for urgency and warning for the West Bank of Jordan. The Israeli administration is going ahead with its plans for a limited self-rule for the Arabs whose land they occupied in 1967.

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JORDAN

The initial reaction and the first impression is that the Israeli occupation forces have had enough of meddling with Arab local politics, and, "urged . . . by the spirit of democracy," want to give the Arabs under occupation a kind of self-rule.

The case is far from being so. And the main driving force behind it is the worry for an appealing Zionist image on the international scene.

The facts of life today are that the Israeli occupation forces are not only trying to dig themselves deeper and deeper in the Arab land, but also to unroot as many Arab residents as they can. Otherwise, why the tens and tens of kibbutzim which have mushroomed in the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, even in the Sinai Desert in the past few years? Why then, the deportation of innocent and helpless Arabs of various walks of life for no obvious reason at all? Why has Israel not complied, until now, with UN resolutions to repatriate the hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled their land and homes looking for security during the 1948, 1956 and 1967 wars?

All peace and justice-lovers are called upon to unmask the Israeli schemes and unveil the satanic machinery which operates under the guise of justice and democracy.

This must be done now, because the bell of doom tolls.

AD-DUSTUR REPORTS STRONG WEST BANK OPPOSITION TO SELF-RULE

Amman AD-DUSTUR in Arabic 24 Oct 75 P 1 JN

[Text] Amman--Reports from the occupied homeland say that the Israeli occupation authorities have taken immediate measures to protect their nationals in the areas occupied in 1948 because of the wave of resentment which has swept the West Bank following Defense Minister Peres' announcement to set up a feeble Palestinian entity under the name of a civil administration to be linked with the Zionist state.

The reports say that the situation is very serious and that the masses of our Palestinian people in the occupied West Bank are firmly and stubbornly opposing the Zionist occupiers and their criminal plans.

As part of the security measures, the occupation authorities have reinforced their troops, which have taken up position on all streets leading to the local mosque. These troops have also surrounded the vicinities of the mosques, fearing that our people would stage demonstrations after the Friday prayers to protest the plan of Defense Minister Peres.

On the other hand, reliable reports received yesterday from the occupied territory say that other large numbers of enemy troops have begun the biggest search campaign so far on all Arab workers who go to work daily in Israeli cities. These reports say that the enemy troops have set up roadblocks on the main highways between Affulah and Haifa, Tulkarm and Yaffo, and Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. These troops stop the buses carrying Arab workers and order the workers to step down for a thorough search. They also interrogate some of them. Several of these workers have been detained on suspicion.

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L E B A N O N

G 1

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE FACTIONAL STRIFE CONTINUE

Karami Meets With French Ambassador

Baghdad INA in Arabic 1335 GMT 4 Nov 75 JN

[Excerpt] Beirut, 4 November--French Ambassador to Lebanon Hubert Argod met here at noon today with Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami. Following the meeting, Argod stated that they discussed the Lebanese situation and exchanged viewpoints and ideas on the current situation.

Franjiyah Receives Karami

Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 4 Nov 75 JN

[Text] At 1350 today, President Sulayman Franjiyah received Prime Minister Rashid Karami, who upon leaving the Ba'abda Palace said he reviewed with his excellency the president the general situation and briefed his excellency on the outcome of contacts he made with the various parties.

Karami Makes Statement

Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 4 Nov 75 JN

[Text] Prime Minister Rashid Karami made the following statement this afternoon: [read by announcer]

First, I would like to read to you the statement issued by the supreme coordination committee which feels, after holding continuous meetings, that it has taken fundamental and effective steps along the course of halting the fighting. In fact, this committee has made sure of the withdrawal of armed men and is now working on the collection and removal of heavy weapons such as mortars, rockets, RPG's, and others. Work has started on the removal of barricades, emplacements, and all armed manifestations. The committee is also trying to put an end to the killings.

As for kidnappings, which we consider a great tragedy, only one incident occurred today and the person kidnaped was released immediately. All of the parties have promised to release all of those abducted in the past who are still being held. The committee wants to affirm that it has been working with officials in a positive spirit and that all parties concerned have shown a definite determination to see the return of life to normal in the country and the implementation of what has been agreed upon in order to enable us to rebuild what has been demolished and build a better Lebanon through dialog.

I will leave the Government House now to meet with his excellency the president of the republic, and then with former president Sham'un. I have had the opportunity to meet with Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, former prime ministers Sa'ib Salam and 'Abdallah al-Yafi, Kamal Jumblatt, and other brothers in order to continue consultations, cooperation [words indistinct] to secure a better climate which will restore calm and reassurance to all Lebanese now that security has returned [words indistinct].

I will attend the cabinet meeting tomorrow. Afterwards, I will return to Government House to personally follow up with the specialized committees all of the topics [words indistinct].

Replying to a question on the French initiative to solve the crisis in Lebanon, Prime Minister Rashid Karami said: We believe that the friendship which links Lebanon to all countries abroad is our big asset.

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LEBANON

It is the result of the positive and constructive policy which Lebanon has been following since the dawn of its independence. Thus, every stand supporting Lebanon's stability, independence, and the integrity of its territory and people is considered a friendly initiative which we welcome with all our heart. Every statement or action of any kind made with our consent and aimed at helping to spread reassurance and consolidate relations of friendship is guaranteed to have our thanks.

Asked what he wanted to address to the citizens and workers, Prime Minister Karami said: I would like to (?tell) everyone that, following this great improvement--and, I can say, after the situation in the country has returned to normal--it is the duty of every employee to resume work [word indistinct] to serve the citizens and render services in response to the general interests. I ask the various banking, industrial, and commercial sectors to [word indistinct] work and activity to restore to Lebanon its prosperity and [words indistinct].

MENA Reports Situation

Cairo MENA in Arabic 0910 GMT 5 Nov 75 JN

[Text] Beirut, 5 November--Measures to control the security situation in Lebanon and to restore calm are already making headway. The results of these measures are evident in the partial activity in the capital this morning, where traffic and pedestrian movement is 50 percent. This activity is expected to increase in the afternoon as the state of fear which the citizens have experienced for the last 2 months has begun to disappear.

All armed manifestations disappeared from Beirut today as the supreme coordination committee at the operations room in the Government House continued to follow the situation minute by minute to deal with any gap that might appear in the implementation of the agreements and measures, and to insure that the situation will not explode again. The committee was expected to hold two meetings today, one of them under Prime Minister Karami, who is personally supervising the implementation of the cease-fire arrangements. The committee last night was able to contain some minor incidents in certain areas. A responsible source on the committee has stated that there still exists a limited problem on the Karantina front and that all sides have agreed to end it before noon today.

Political sources believe that if the peace agreement between the combatants holds, Prime Minister Karami will try to turn the struggle into a political dialog between them in order to reach a common denominator that will be the basis for political, social and economic reforms.

The Lebanese prime minister has actually paved the way for this peaceful confrontation through the contacts which he has held with the various political leaders in the past few days, the latest of which was his meeting with Interior Minister Camille Sham'un yesterday. The results of these contacts and the nature of the next steps will become clear after the meeting which the cabinet will hold under President Sulayman Franjiyah today.

The Lebanese newspaper AN-NAHAR today urged Prime Minister Karami to continue his efforts in this direction, saying that "at the cabinet meeting today, Karami must pursue his efforts to the point of agreeing with president on issuing a statement, by the president himself, on the general situation, on Lebanese-Palestinian relations and on his full confidence in Prime Minister Karami and in all that he has done and the responsibilities he has assumed."

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S Y R I A

H 1

RESOLUTION ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE DRAFTED FOR UN SESSION

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 4 Nov 75 JN

[Text] Assistant Foreign Minister Dr 'Abd al-Ghani ar-Rafi'i received at the Foreign Ministry this afternoon the heads of the diplomatic missions of the Arab, Moslem, nonaligned, socialist, and African-Asian countries regarding the draft resolution which Syria has drawn up on the Palestinian issue in consultation and coordination with the PLO. Syria will submit the draft resolution to the UN General Assembly at its current session, during which the Palestinian issue will be discussed.

Dr ar-Rafi'i gave the heads of the diplomatic missions the text of the Syrian draft resolution, which contains a (?substantiation) of the Palestinian rights and reiterates the UN resolutions which have been issued for the sake of the Palestinian issue, particularly the two resolutions issued during last year's UN General Assembly session.

Dr ar-Rafi'i explained to them the contents of the draft resolution and its significance as an historic document aimed at supporting the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people and at establishing their rights. Ar-Rafi'i asked the heads of the missions to acquaint their governments with the text of the draft resolution and asked that they lend their support and backing to it when it is presented to the UN General Assembly.

The draft resolution reads:

After reviewing the explosive situation in the Middle East area as a result of Israel's continued refusal to implement UN resolutions, particularly resolution No 3236 pertaining to the rights of the Palestinian people; and while stressing its Resolution 3236 and its previous resolutions in this regard; while declaring that the continued disregard for the rights of the Palestinian people will not be conducive toward the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East area, the absence of which is considered a threat to international peace and security; while stressing its Resolution No 3237 pertaining to the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people; while considering the participation of the Palestinian people represented by the PLO as a basic matter in any effort to tackle the situation in the Middle East area in order to reach a just and durable peace in the area; while stressing that the elements of peace lie in a comprehensive withdrawal from all of the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and in the implementation of the UN resolutions pertaining to the Palestinian people's national rights, particularly Resolution No 3236; while considering that Israel's adherence to its stand requires the application of Chapter VII of the Charter, the General Assembly has decided to:

1. Call on the PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian Arab people, to participate in the efforts that are being exerted within the framework of the United Nations to reach a just and durable peace in the Middle East on an equal basis with all of the other sides.
2. Call on the UN Security Council to amend its Resolution No 243 of 22 November 1967 in the light of the two UN General Assembly resolutions, Nos 3236 and 3237 of 1974.
3. Call on the UN Security Council to apply Chapter VII of the Charter against Israel because of its continued refusal to respect the Charter and to implement the UN resolutions.

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SYRIA

4. Ask all countries to stop their military, economic, political, and cultural aid to Israel.

5. Ask the UN secretary general to follow up on the implementation of this resolution and to submit a report to the UN General Assembly within 3 months during an extraordinary session to be held especially to discuss the UN secretary general's report on what has been implemented regarding the Palestinian issue and the Middle East situation.

AL-ASAD SPEECH AT BANQUET IN HONOR OF SENGHOR

Damascus SANA in Arabic 1747 GMT 1 Nov 75 NC

[Text] Damascus, 1 November--President Hafiz al-Asad made the following speech at the dinner banquet which he hosted tonight in honor of Senegalese President Leopold Senghor:

President Leopold Senghor, members of the Senegalese delegation, gentlemen: It is a great pleasure for us in the Syrian Arab Republic to receive our dear friend, Leopold Senghor, and the members of the Senegalese delegation accompanying him. When I welcome our distinguished guest on behalf of our people and our party, and on my own behalf, I am expressing the sentiments of the true friendship and great respect which we harbor for President Senghor, and I am equally expressing our people's friendship with and love for the Senegalese people who are linked to the Syrian Arab people by numerous ties that have been deepened and strengthened through the passage of history.

There is, Mr President, the spiritual bond that exists between our two countries. It is a bond that makes us look upon the Senegalese as a fraternal people. This bond which has been a factor throughout history in the continual intermingling of civilizations, will continue to discharge this role in achieving the intermingling and harmonization of the two peoples to serve their common causes and interests.

This spiritual bond has spurred many Senegalese brothers to come to our country to seek knowledge. They are welcomed and cared for by our people.

Among the ties that bind our two countries it pleases me to refer to the large number of Syrian Arabs in Senegal, where they have made a positive contribution to the country's social and economic life and have come to constitute a productive part of the Senegalese society.

Added to this intermingling of civilizations is the fact that the Syrian Arab Republic and Senegal are among the Third World states struggling for development and progress and struggling to establish a new economic system in the world based on justice, equality and respect for the rights of the developing countries. They are also two active members of the nonaligned countries and two important elements of Afro-Arab cooperation.

Thus you see, Mr President, that the ties that exist between our two countries and peoples are numerous. I am confident that your visit, with what it entails in the way of strengthening of relations between us, will be of consequence for the entire relations of friendship and cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and Republic of Senegal, so that our friendship will be consolidated and the spheres of mutual cooperation will expand and multiply.

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Dear friend, we have met at the summit conference of nonaligned states. Before this meeting, and after it, we have been following the struggle and march of the Senegalese people under your leadership. We have known in President Senghor an outstanding poet and man of letters of world wide fame. We have known in him the wise statesman who has led the Senegalese people along the path of progress and development, and who has contributed much to the African struggle for the freedom and independence of African man, and to the struggle against all forms of tyranny, racism, exploitation and imperialism. Your combative stands are well-known and admired.

In this respect, I mention in particular your strong solidarity with the Arab people in their struggle for the liberation of their occupied territory and the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. Your understanding of and support for our just cause before, during and after the October war are received with great appreciation and gratitude by the masses of our people.

Your wide knowledge and perception make you very assuredly stand on the side of right and justice. I am confident that your direct experience when you visited the area within the framework of the committee of the wise men has enriched your knowledge of our cause and also acquainted you with the extent of Israel's intransigence, defiance of the world community and adherence to falsehood and aggression.

President, gentlemen: There is one more fact which I believe it is useful to reiterate and emphasize. This fact is that we want and truly desire peace. We have sincerely and honestly expressed full preparedness to work for the success of every sincere and serious effort for the establishment of a just peace in this area.

There is still one more fact which the whole world admits, and I find no harm in mentioning it again. This fact is that the October war which we waged to liberate our lands and regain the rights of the Palestinian people changed the prevailing situation in the area in a radical manner which could have led to the the establishment of the cherished just peace.

Since the first day of the October war which our armed forces waged with great courage and high efficiency backed by the masses of our people which confronted the conditions of the war with steadfastness and a spirit of sacrifice and supported by the masses of our Arab nation, I affirmed that we do not fight for love of war but for the sake of peace. But what happened after the October war was an attempt to contain its positive results and a steady effort to circumvent these results in order to restore the situation to its previous state.

We are very clear, and very simply say that the principles of the just peace are known and that their features have been drawn up by the UN resolutions. These principles are the complete withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people. Peace can be realized by these two supports together but there can be no peace without them both or if one of them is sheared off.

We are now facing a campaign of misleading whose purpose is to give aggressive Israel gains at the expense of the Arab rights and to lead us into believing that peace is imminent. We do not want anybody to deceive us and we do not want to deceive ourselves by false illusions.

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We refuse to allow the blood of our martyrs, sacrifices of our people and our rights to be wasted in order that Israel's falsehood and aggression are consolidated.

Our land is our right and we cannot squander any part of it. The rights of the Palestinian people are established and we cannot bargain on any part of them. Apart from this, we seek peace very seriously and sincerely.

Mr President, friends: We follow up your successful efforts in the field of development in Senegal with much pleasure and satisfaction and we wish you more success.

Once again, I feel confident that your visit to our country shall be an important turning point on the way to promoting the friendship and boosting the cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Senegal. It is a cause of great pleasure and satisfaction that our discussions today have manifested a similarity in points of view and proved that there is a wide scope for strengthening cooperation between our countries.

Finally, I address to you our traditional Arab greeting: You are welcome in our home.

Senghor Banquet Speech

Damascus SANA in Arabic 1815 GMT 1 Nov 75 NC

[Text] Damascus, 1 November--Senegalese President Leopold Senghor made the following speech at the dinner banquet President Hafiz al-Asad hosted in his honor:

Mr President: You will undoubtedly have realized that the official visit I am paying to the Syrian Arab Republic in response to your kind invitation gives me pleasure for more than one reason. First there is the fraternal reception we have been accorded since our arrival in Damascus, your great capital. The Syrian people rallied behind a great socialist party--the Ba'th Party--and a well-known leader who enjoys the respect of the world. The Syrian people have received me and my delegation with all the traditions of Arab hospitality.

Undoubtedly this friendly gesture is directed to all Senegalese people who feel they are close to your people despite the distance separating the two countries. The Syrian and Senegalese knew each other even before they won their independence. To be sure of this, it is sufficient to see that an important community of Syrian nationals in Senegal has merged in the national family and is contributing to the country's economic and social development.

On the other hand, a large number of Senegalese citizens who were attracted by the image of a country which preserves a precious heritage of the Islamic civilization have been coming to Syria for a very long time. This shows that the relations between our peoples are not new. We must now raise these relations to the standard of dynamic cooperation which will take into consideration the present requirements represented in the solidarity of the third world, particularly the solidarity of the Arab and African peoples. My visit--and this is the second reason for my pleasure--will assuredly consolidate the foundations for the realization of this aim.

I have often said that Arab-African cooperation in all fields has been one of the pillars of Senegal's foreign policy since the independence of our country in 1960.

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When I suggested during the colonialist era that the Arabic language be taught in Senegal's secondary schools, the aim was not only to provide an opportunity for getting acquainted with the rich Arab culture which yielded numerous immortal philosophical and literary works but also to strengthen the spiritual ties which bind the East and West with black Africa.

Senegal, which has always been an open country for the fertile contributions of the Arab civilization and which lies on the borders of the two worlds--the African Negro and the Berger Arab--surely realizes the importance of this position and therefore works for the realization of the Arab-African cooperation which must cover cultural and economic fields simultaneously.

I am happy, Mr President, to know for sure that the boosting of this cooperation is also the aim of the Syrian Arab Republic under your wise leadership. The stands of our two countries on the matters of the hour are close if not identical. Syria and Senegal are two active members of the nonaligned group struggling against all forms of injustice surrounding the third world such as the deterioration of the exchange relations, racism and racist discrimination and particularly the occupation of the Arab territories. Both countries are also struggling for the establishment of a new world economic system.

The dictates of international peace and security demand the evacuation of the Arab territories occupied in June 1967 and the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinians. For 9 years, we have been ceaselessly declaring from various platforms it is necessary to establish an independent and sovereign state for the Palestinians on the land of Palestine and that there can be no hope for establishing peace in the Middle East if a direct dialog is not conducted between the Israelis and the PLO.

Mr President: Senegal follows with interest the progress achieved in all fields in your country. This progress is achieved under your wise leadership by the discipline and courage of the sons of this country and the dynamism of the Ba'th Party.

I am confident that the discussions we will hold during my visit will bolster the ties of friendship between the Syrian Arab Republic and Senegal and lay down the foundations of a fruitful cooperation between our countries.

Gentlemen: Let us drink a toast to the health of His Excellency President Hafiz al-Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, the prosperity of the friendly Syrian people, the development of Syrian-Senegalese relations within the framework of the Arab-African cooperation, and the solidarity of the nations of the third world.

Al-Asad Meets With Senghor

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 3 Nov 75 JN

[Excerpt] President Hafiz al-Asad received at his house at 1800 today President of the Republic of Senegal Leopold Senghor. The two presidents held a private meeting during which they resumed the discussion they had begun the day before yesterday on the situation in the Arab area and Arab-African cooperation. Their talks also dealt with bilateral relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Senegal.

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Senghor Holds Press Conference

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1215 GMT 4 Nov 75 JN

[Text] Senegal President Leopold Senghor today lauded the stand of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and its secretary general, struggling comrade Hafiz al-Asad. He said: The Ba'th Party is considered an example for us in Senegal because it has followed the principles of democracy and socialism and our party in Senegal is pursuing the same course. At a press conference held this morning at the guest place, President Senghor said that President Hafiz al-Asad is a wise and courageous leader who adheres to justice and freedom and whose proposals are legitimate.

President Senghor reaffirmed his country's stand in solidarity with the Arab nation's struggle for the liberation of all occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. The guest president added that his country broke relations with Israel after the October liberation war because of its aggressive intentions. He added: We do not hate the Jews, but there is a basic question; namely, the Palestinian Arab people whom world Zionism is opposing. President Senghor supported the establishment of a secular Palestinian state with an Arab majority in which Moslems, Christians, and Jews would coexist.

The Senegalese president described his talks with President Hafiz al-Asad as positive, particularly because Syria is in the forefront of the Arab cause. He said: I came to Syria to learn the facts of Syria's stand toward Arab-Zionist conflict. Senghor said that his country voted at the United Nations against Zionism. He said that Zionism is a racist movement aimed at expansion, and that there is no better proof of this than the settlements which the Israeli occupation forces have built in the occupied Arab territories. He also said that any peace talks must be held with the presence of the Palestinians represented by the PLO. He said that the Palestinian people are the basis of the question and that Zionism, which does not recognize the Palestinian people's rights, will be faced with all forms of struggle, not only by the Arabs alone but also by those of us who are struggling against it.

Speaking about his tour in the Arab area, President Senghor said that it comes within the framework of cooperation between his country and the Arab countries. He said that there will be an Arab-African summit conference which will be attended by Arab and OAU heads of states. The venue and date for this conference will be set later. It will be aimed at strengthening the links of Arab-African cooperation.

Meets With 'Arafat, Departs

Cairo MENA in Arabic 0945 GMT 4 Nov 75 JN

[Text] Damascus, 4 November--Senegalese President Leopold Senghor met this morning with PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat. The meeting was held at the guest palace before the Senegalese president left Damascus at the end of his official 4-day visit to Syria.

Cooperation Agreement Signed

Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1615 GMT 4 Nov 75 JN

[Text] A renewable 5-year agreement on cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, technology, and trade unions was signed between the Syrian Arab Republic and Senegal at the Foreign Ministry at noon today.

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N O R T H A F R I C A

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SPANISH SAHARA

REPORTAGE LINKED WITH SAHARAN DEVELOPMENTS

Clashes With Moroccan Elements

Madrid in Spanish to Europe 1900 GMT 4 Nov 75 LD

[Text] According to some reports, for which we have been unable to get official confirmation, Spanish troops in the Sahara have been put on alert, despite the fact that reports that Moroccan forces had infiltrated the territory have been denied. It has been confirmed, however, that yesterday there were armed clashes between Moroccan elements and an armed group which, according to some versions, were guerrillas of the F. POLISARIO, while others say they were Algerian forces.

Clashes Continue

Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2230 GMT 4 Nov 75 LD

[Carlos Blanco dispatch from El Aaiun]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Yesterday you made vague references to armed clashes between troops of the F. POLISARIO and Moroccan forces.

[Blanco] Well, it is still thought that there have been clashes and that there are some now, above all on the eastern border, that is to say, near Algeria.

In addition to official sources, which state that clashes have taken place between Moroccan forces and possibly the F. POLISARIO or even Algerian forces, Saharan sources have assured me that in the first clash 150 Moroccan soldiers--it is believed that it was a company--were attacked by a patrol or by members of the F. POLISARIO, and 50 Moroccan soldiers were killed, with 40 wounded and 60 taken prisoner; five trucks and four or five landrovers were captured. [sentence indistinct].

It is believed that there was a further clash in Hausa, with 24 Moroccans arrested and imprisoned, and that a rather lengthy and fierce battle is going on in [name indistinct]. According to these same Saharan sources, Algeria offered air cover to the patrols of the F. POLISARIO which were fighting against the Moroccans inside Saharan territory, but the F. POLISARIO refused Algeria's help.

El Aaiun Reported Calm

Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1330 GMT 4 Nov 75 LD

[Dispatch from Carlos Blanco in El Aaiun]

[Excerpts] While the evacuation continues at its normal pace, I think that El Aaiun is busier [words indistinct] than it has been in the past few days. The ship Plus Ultra, which will carry some 50 vehicles and almost 250 people to Las Palmas, is already here.

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We can see today that the special measures which had been taken in the city have disappeared from some areas and in others have become much more [word indistinct]. Nevertheless, the curfew is still being maintained for the moment. One thing stands out today: the important meeting being held at this moment in the Capitania offices under the chairmanship of Ramon Cuadra Medina, captain general of the Canaries. The meeting is also attended by the staff of the Sahara sector and by members of the unified command of the Canaries.

Osman Confers in Madrid

Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 4 Oct 75 LD

[Text] Prime Minister Ahmed Osman held more talks with Spanish Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro in Madrid this morning. Ahmed Osman arrived in Madrid yesterday and was received by Prince Juan Carlos, the acting head of state. He also had talks yesterday with his counterpart, Mr Navarro.

Statement on Departure

Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1330 GMT 4 Nov 75 LD

[Text] Moroccan Prime Minister Osman left for Agadir from Barajas airport at about 1300. King Hassan II is waiting for him in Agadir to learn the results of his talks with Prince Juan Carlos, acting head of state, and Carlos Arias Navarro, the prime minister. Osman was seen off by Solis Ruiz, minister-secretary general of the [National] Movement. Before boarding the plane which was to take him home, he made the following statement.

I have been entrusted by the King of Morocco with a message for Prince Juan Carlos [words indistinct]. I can say that it is a message of friendship and fraternity between the two leaders, the two states and the people of Spain and Morocco. I have had several working meetings with the prince and the prime minister. Negotiations are continuing now and will continue in the future. We hope to achieve positive results. Asked whether there was any problem [word indistinct] during the Green March, he said "no, there are false reports and the march will continue perfectly and exactly organized." He said that the march will be continuing, that neither will the march interrupt the negotiations, nor will negotiations interrupt the march. He hopes above all that it develops and comes off successfully, and he wants to look after the security of the Saharan people.

Arrives in Agadir

Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 4 Nov 75 LD

[Excerpts] A short while ago Prime Minister Ahmed Osman arrived in Agadir coming from Madrid on board a special flight. He was accompanied by 'Abd as-Salam Znina, secretary of state at the prime minister's office in charge of public and Sahara affairs.

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Minister on Talks With Boumediene

Algiers APS in French 1100 GMT 4 Oct 75 LD

[Summary] Algiers, APS--M. Bahnini, Moroccan minister of state for cultural affairs, was received yesterday by President Boumediene. "After pointing out that he had been charged by the Moroccan sovereign with conveying a message to President Boumediene, Mr. Bahnini stated: The calm climate which characterized our relations has recently taken a turn for the worse. I hope, he added, that it will soon improve.

"Replying to a question concerning the decisions of the International Court of Justice and the United Nations relating to the right of the Saharan people to self-government, the Moroccan special envoy said: I do not think that the right of the Saharan people to self-government has been unanimously approved. Certainly there are trends which favor self-government, but there are also differences in positions and points of view on the subject of known questions between Algeria and Morocco. I hope, he added, that these differences will disappear and that the Arab Magreb will continue [words indistinct] that it had previously begun.

"Asked about the repercussions of the Western Sahara question on relations among the states of the Arab Maghreb, Mr. Bahnini replies: I am very optimistic. I think in fact that this question cannot affect inter-Maghreb relations. Personally, he pointed out, I regret what has happened and I hope that the present climate will improve."

Well informed sources say that M. Bahnini's conversation with Boumediene "concerned bilateral relations in particular and the overall situation in the area. It is thought that President Boumediene confirmed to the Moroccan envoy the unchanging position of Algeria concerning the Western Sahara and the means for solving this problem while guaranteeing the spirit of the UN resolutions and avoiding tension in the area."

Benhima Press Conference

Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 2300 GMT 4 Nov 75 LD

[Text] Minister of State for Information Ahmad Taibi Benhima held a press conference within the framework of his daily meetings with foreign newsmen who have come to Morocco to cover the Green March. Saharan Assembly President Khatri Ould Sa'id al-Jammani also held a press conference at Agadir in which he replied to questions by Moroccan, Arab, and foreign newsmen.

There will be no negotiations or dealings over the march. The continuous negotiations between Morocco and Spain will not affect the popular march. This was stated by Ahmad Taibi Benhima at his press conference.

In reply to a question about the mission of Andre Lewin, head of the office and special envoy of Dr Kurt Waldheim, Benhima said: First of all, Mr Lewin heard an important statement by Khatri Ould Sa'id al-Jammani. His majesty the king received the United Nations envoy for an hour who conveyed a personal message from Dr Waldheim regarding the resolution passed by the Security Council 2 days ago. His majesty made frank observations on this resolution. Ahmad Taibi Benhima began his press conference by announcing that his majesty will address the people at 1830 tomorrow.

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The minister told the newsmen in a reply to a question about the results of the visit of Premier Ahmed Osman to Madrid: Ahmad Osman went to Madrid to continue negotiations with Spain. His statement prior to his departure from the Spanish capital was made in the presence of Secretary General of the National Movement Solis Ruiz. The Moroccan-Spanish negotiations are being continued and will continue.

Benhima then commented on reports allegedly attributed to informed Spanish sources on the Moroccan-Spanish negotiations and said: The prime minister carried out a clear mission based on principles that can be regarded as a protocol, the results of the talks held between his majesty and Sr Solis at Marrekech. As for the march, it is not a subject for discussion or negotiations with Spain or the United Nations. In reply to a question on rumored Moroccan military movements near the Western Sahara, Benhima said that there were no military personnel among the volunteers because the march is a peaceful and popular march. He added: As you saw for yourselves yesterday when you visited the town of Tafayah and met with some foreign doctors present among us and WHO observers, the health of the volunteers is sound. There has been no outbreak of disease.

The Libyan radio correspondent asked the minister: Is Morocco interested in sovereignty over the Sahara or is it interested in the minerals beneath the Sahara soil? Benhima said: When the Libyan people struggled against Italian fascism they did not know that the Libyan soil contained oil. Nevertheless, they went on fighting for independence. We in Morocco also fight to regain our national soil, whether poor or rich. Its wealth is another motive for more the struggle to insure that it does not remain in the hands of others.

Algeria Reemphasizes its Position

Algiers Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 4 Nov 75 LD

[Summary] The situation in the Western Sahara is becoming more tense. Morocco's diplomacy is losing credibility in the eyes of observers in the face of Spain's firm stand. The Moroccan prime minister was received by Juan Carlos in Madrid yesterday, and the proposed march has been postponed again. Waldheim is scheduled to make a second visit to the countries concerned, his envoy having arrived in Agadir today with a message for King Hassan II.

Algeria has succeeded in mobilizing a large part of world opinion on the side of self-determination for the people of the Western Sahara. Algeria's stand has been affirmed in two recent Foreign Ministry communiques and in a statement on French (?television) yesterday by Foreign Minister Bouteflika. We call on Spain to put an end (?forthwith) to colonial domination, without shirking its responsibilities to international opinion, the foreign minister underlined.

Radio Condemns Green March

Madrid in Spanish to Europe 2100 GMT 4 Nov 75 LD

[Text] Radio Sahara has been broadcasting the following message of warning to the Saharan population throughout the day:

People of the Sahara: Today 4 November, has forecast what Hassan II has called the Green March begins in Tarfaya. This suicide march, which plans to occupy the territory, is doomed to failure, and the government has taken all measures which will lead to its break-up, using force if necessary.

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This has been stated by the Security Council and the Spanish representative to the United Nations. The best cooperation which the Saharan people can provide is to maintain order and calm, with everybody going to work and ensuring that life in El Aaiun carries on as normal.

F. POLISARIO Asks Spanish Alliance

Madrid ABC in Spanish 28 Oct 75 p 15 WA

[Text] Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 27 October (Report from our correspondent, Antonio Cruz Dominguez, by telephone) -- Members of F. POLISARIO stated to the newspaper LA PRENSA, whose special correspondent, together with three colleagues, took part in an exclusive press interview with members of the Saharan party: "We want to remind the Cortes that Spain continues to have the responsibility for defending the Saharan people. We want to ask the Spanish people to make common cause with us in this situation. We do not totally reject the referendum, only a referendum used to thwart the people's will."

After stating that the struggle always has been for complete independence without any type of submission, they added: "The national unity of the Saharan people is the step necessary for being able to advance in this new stage. The numbers of the Saharan population do not permit at this time that any of the people be divided by ideologies, especially if any of them comply with the interests of foreign countries."

In the face of a possible Spanish-Moroccan agreement, the members of the F. POLISARIO expressed the opinion that at this time there exists anticipation with regard to the alternatives which may result from the talks between the two countries. They said: "We hope that when Spain departs from here, it will leave the sovereignty of the territory in the hands of its legitimate owners, i.e., the Saharan people. We believe that Spain will fulfill this obligation, which it has assumed before the world and which it has repeated many times before the United Nations and before the leaders of our people." Also in the face of what the brother of King Hassan disclosed concerning the Moroccan offer to Spain in exchange for the sovereignty of the Sahara, the members of the F. POLISARIO stated to LA PRENSA: "We think that a country's dignity is worth more than phosphates and bases, more than all the money in the world. Spain has given its word of honor and we believe that it will honor it. So far it has worked intensely at the international level to achieve the self-determination of the Saharan people."

In conclusion, they stated that the Saharan people are now experiencing optimal conditions for facing independence with all its consequences and that the Saharans who are on the side of Morocco are a tiny minority.

Deadline Set for Evacuation

Paris AFP in Spanish 1940 GMT 4 Nov 75 PA

[Text] El Aaiun, 4 Nov--It was learned here today that all Spanish civilians in the Western Sahara must leave the territory under Spanish administration by (?8) November. Evacuation of some 12,000 Spanish subjects is proceeding rapidly, with only 4 days remaining before the date on which only troops will be left in the area for the defense and protection of Saharan communities pending resolution of the Western Sahara problem. As evacuees crowd into the ships and planes that will take them to the Canary Islands and later to the continent, the climate that prevails in El Aaiun, the capital, is that of a departure without hope of return. Evacuees are selling all their possessions at incredible prices, while businessmen are transferring their businesses complete with stock to natives. Automobiles with "for sale" signs are seen in all the streets.

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Despite this feverish climate, there has been no violence, the Saharan population remains calm. The curfew established a week ago by the Spanish Armed Forces remains in effect. Shock troops have gone to the front, to positions some 10 km from the border with southern Morocco, where thousands of pilgrims of the "Green March" are still awaiting an order from King Hassan II of Morocco to cross into the Western Sahara.

Government Provides Census Figures

Madrid ABC in Spanish 28 Oct 75 p 15 WA

[Text] Las Palmas, 27 October (CIFRA) -- According to data provided by the Government General of the Territory with a view of the referendum, the population of the Sahara under Spanish administration has risen to 74,902 persons. Of that figure, 39,130 are men and 35,772 are women. The number of Saharan natives totals 73,497 persons; residents total 858 persons; and there are 548 foreigners. The city of El Aaiun has 28,010 inhabitants, Smara has 7,280, Villa Cisneros has 5,370 and Ausert has 2,448.

The Saharan tribes are characterized not only by their origin but also by their customary occupations. In the Izarguen tribe drivers are plentiful; in the Ait Iahsen, skilled workers; in the Ulad Delim, soldiers; in the Arosien, noncommissioned officers; in the Ulad Tidrarin, maharreros [possibly camel raisers]; and members of the Reguibat engage in trade and other activities.

SUDAN

PRESIDENT ADDRESSES PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 0815 GMT 3 Nov 75 LD/EA

[Speech by President Numeiry at opening session of the People's Assembly in Khartoum on 3 November--live]

[Excerpts] Brothers! We will make intensive efforts to uncover our hidden resources. Agreements for the commercial exploitation of oil have been concluded with four of the companies engaged in oil prospecting. The program for experimental drilling will begin in the Red Sea before the sacred Christmas festival, in December this year. [applause] The drilling period will last for 6 months, during which three experimental wells will be opened. Prospecting for oil in the central hinterlands of the Sudan will continue, in accordance with formulated programs.

The coming year will also witness the birth of a new public corporation to manage the Port Sudan-Khartoum oil pipeline.

Free brothers! [word indistinct] agriculture constitutes the sinews of the national economy in the Sudan and will continue to do so for a long period of time. It is on agriculture that we fundamentally rely to increase our national income, an increase that is compatible with our aspirations. Our agricultural policy is based, among other things, on foundations of self-sufficiency in all agricultural commodities and the accumulation of a surplus for export. The remaining period of the amended 5-year plan, in accordance with the objectives of the phased work programs, aims to ensure sufficiency, then surpluses and then prosperity.

The revolution is within sight, praise be to God! Within the next 2 years the 5-year plan and phased action program will expire, on 30 June 1977.

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The next 2 years will be busy ones with the completion of big development projects, especially in the fields of self-sufficiency in agricultural products and agricultural industrialization projects for sugar and textiles. This is in addition to the expansion of transport and communications projects, health and education services. As the issue of development is always the primary issue of the revolution, to which it gives most of its attention [words indistinct] and provides for it all the available material and human potential, the organs concerned will now start preparing, under my direction, for a comprehensive national plan for a longer period of time. Within the framework of the comprehensive national plan I have directed the organs concerned in the government to start immediately to prepare a 6-year plan to begin on 1 July 1977 and end on 30 June 1983. On completion, the plan will be submitted to your esteemed assembly in May 1977.

Free brothers! Nothing is left for me now except to speak to you briefly about our foreign policy. It is a policy that has remained stable and clear, does not go to excesses and is not affected by maneuvers. It is a policy founded on the principles of defending our national independence and nonintervention in the affairs of others, the strengthening of regional and international solidarity and cooperation, the struggle for peace and freedom and self-determination and opposition to racialism in all its diverse manifestations, especially in South Africa and Palestine. [applause]. We will do what we have done in the past. We will be guided by these important principles in our foreign policy. We will continue to strengthen and make firm our warm relations with the Arab states in all possible fields and will work to raise the Arab political atmosphere above ephemeral faults [shawaib] and discord. This is because of our faith that the Arab nation is always ultimately able to overcome and go beyond marginal differences and lateral disturbances.

We will continue to support the people of Palestine, who are struggling with great courage [applause] in defense of their legitimate national rights [word indistinct] throughout the years of tyrannical Zionism. We support the struggle of Egypt and Syria and the rest of the other Arabs to regain their occupied territory. [applause] We will support the struggle of the Moslems and the Arabs for the redemption of the usurped holy Jerusalem. We supported the second disengagement agreement. If another disengagement takes place in another occupied Arab territory, we will also support it. [applause] This is because we will never dictate a lesson to any state on the manner of regaining its territory or defending its honor. [applause]

We will continue exercising our [word indistinct] role in strengthening Arab-African solidarity, believing that it is an important axis in the Third World movement to which we all, Arabs and Africans, belong. In this connection I should like to mention that in a few days time I will be welcoming with all friendship dear brother President Leopold-Sedar Senghor [applause], President of the Republic of Senegal and Dear Brother President Ibrahim Muhammad al-Hamadi, president of the Yemen Arab Republic [applause] during our celebrations of the 20th anniversary of independence.

Brothers! We will always keep our pledges; we will cooperate and consolidate our solidarity with our neighbors, thus emphasizing goodneighborliness and fraternity. We appeal to the responsible brothers in Ethiopia, into whose hands authority has passed, and the Eritrean brothers, to stop the fighting and the bloodshed between them and overcome their differences and difficulties through dialog, understanding and love, as dear Ethiopia will not progress without peace. [applause]

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PRESIDENT RECEIVES FRC AMBASSADOR

Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 1 Nov 75 LD/EA

[Text] At 1100 hours this morning President Numeiry received at his office in the People's Palace Yuesh Chang, the ambassador of the People's Republic of China in Khartoum, on the occasion of his return from leave.

The leader-president said after the meeting: "During the meeting the discussion dealt with development projects which are being implemented by the FRC and the future of the two countries' relations after the conclusion of these projects."

The president said it had been decided to inaugurate the first phase of the Madani-Al Qadarif road project, which extends from Wad Madani to the (Faw) Mountains, as part of the country's celebrations of national unity day, next March. It had also been decided to inaugurate the friendship hall and the textile factory at Al-Hasahisah as part of the celebrations for the seventh anniversary of the glorious May revolution.

The ambassador congratulated the leader-president for defeating the reactionary conspiracy and for the stability that the country had enjoyed during the (?years) of the revolution.

TUNISIA

PRESIDENT INTERVIEWED BY FRENCH CORRESPONDENT

Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 1 Nov 75 LD

[Excerpts] President Habib Bourguiba recently granted an interview to the correspondent of the French weekly magazine LE POINT in which he replied to a number of questions and explained Tunisia's attitude toward the Middle East issue, Tunisia's economic policy, and relations between Tunisia and France.

Replying to a question on his excellency's view of the agreement concluded between Egypt and Israel, the great fighter said: First it is illogical that we should hand down an erroneous judgment on the agreement.

For example, it is unfair that we should deduce from the agreement that President as-Sadat has betrayed the cause of the Arab countries. It is also risky to think that peace will spread rapidly beginning with the amendment of the [words indistinct].

All this emanates from imagination or illusions from the political angle. I wish to place things in their perspective, as it is said. Therefore, we have the right to ask about what induced As-Sadat to do what he did. He realized that his country cannot fight the United States. This fact does not apply to Egypt alone, but to the whole Arab world. This is what led him to enter into negotiations with Kissinger [words indistinct].

I tend to believe that he could have obtained more than what he acquired. However, the matter is connected with difficult problems and I will not allow myself to hand down any kind of verdict on them. However, I am confident that if As-Sadat stops at this limit his position will be endangered, contrary to what will happen if he uses this impetus for peace to draw the Americans and the Israelis into negotiations on a larger scale. Then the Sinai agreement will be considered a good stage.

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Concerning the convocation of the Geneva conference, his excellency the president said: There is no course they can call [word indistinct] because the conclusion of matters is more important than the means used for resolving them. What does the Arab world want concerning the present issue?

It wants the Palestinians to win a homeland they will recover because, logically, it is unacceptable that this small people should be doomed to destitution forever. There is no kindhearted person in the world who can possibly accept this injustice.

In order that this issue, on which peace depends in that part of the world, can be resolved, Israel and the United States should take other steps further than those taken hitherto. It is imperative to speed up the pace because the agreement concluded between As-Sadat and Rabin is about to lose its effect quicker than what is thought.

The president replied to another question concerning the possibility of the emergence of a Mediterranean policy. His excellency said: I do not know whether a Mediterranean policy will come into existence one of these days. What I certainly know is the existence of a Mediterranean Sea in which the prominent leaders of our present world have long been interested. The Russians need to pass through the straits and to pass freely through the canal.

The Americans need Gibraltar to watch the Russians and to guard what they call the southern flank of NATO. For this reason, the Mediterranean has become a field of maneuvers and has completely broken away from the control of the states bordering it. This state of affairs is not without dangers. It is through this sensing of danger that a Mediterranean policy should emerge. Tunis wishes its emergence. We believe that France shares this hope with Tunisia.

Concerning the visit of Giscard d'Estaing to Tunisia, President Habib Bourguiba said that his guest will find out for himself the extent of the friendship which the Tunisian people feel for the French people. He will then see what can be achieved by an Islamic country which is determined to remain loyal to its ancient traditions and to rid itself of the inclinations which draw it toward rigidity.

Concerning the arrival of French investors in Tunisia, the president said, Tunisia now has a prosperous economy and ample manpower. It also has institutions which enjoy a great deal of solidity.

When I die the succession will take place with the appropriate calm and order. I can also tell you the name of the person who will succeed me. He is the present prime minister, Mr Hedi Nouira, whose economic and social policy has clearly succeeded. Therefore, no crisis at all is expected.

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I S R A E L

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CHANGES IN FORD ADMINISTRATION ELICIT COMMENT

Radio Correspondent's Views

Jerusalem International Service in English 1200 GMT 4 Nov 75 LD

[Excerpts] Looking at some of the reasons behind the latest political moves in Washington is our correspondent in the U.S. capital, Charles (?Senevesi): In Schlesinger, Ford removed the only cabinet member who is an intellectual equal of Henry Kissinger and whose independence of mind was unique in the Nixon and Ford administrations. The new defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, is a very ambitious man but he is a creature of President Ford and he has no (?plans or desire) to stand up and profess a dissenting view. As a result of the shakeup, from now on the Ford administration will speak with one voice on issues of national security and foreign policy. It is well known that Schlesinger's views on detente and strategic arms limitation agreement were considerably tougher than Kissinger's. It has been suspected that Schlesinger is in basic disagreement with Kissinger's approaches to a number of international problems, including the interim agreements in Sinai. There are suggestions that Ford is responding to domestic political pressures, but the consensus is that Ford is moving toward the conservative right and Rockefeller's decision not to run again (?suits this pattern).

For Israel, perhaps the most significant of the changes is the introduction of Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense.

Morning Papers Comment

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 4 Nov 75 TA

[Morning press review]

[Excerpts] This morning's editorials assess the extent to which the Washington administration reshuffle will affect the somewhat tense relations between Israel and the United States.

DAVAR doubts that the reshuffle will cause any kind of change in the republican administration's present trend toward conducting an even-handed policy, chiefly aimed at consolidating ties with Egypt and the other Arab countries. Even if Dr Kissinger continues as the major Middle East authority, Israel clearly will have to cultivate its connections with the other senior administration officials in Washington with greater determination.

The Histadrut organ contends that two basic assumptions have been disproved: That the President is more friendly toward us than his secretary of state; and that the Pentagon is more sympathetic toward us than the State Department.

DAVAR says that Vice President Rockefeller's announcement that he will not run with President Ford will facilitate the president's efforts to rally the Republican Party around him and to improve his prospects in the struggle with the democrats by presenting a younger candidate for the vice presidency.

HANODI'A reminds us that the two main protagonists in the Washington dismissals affair are of Jewish origin. There was a recent difference between them on a matter of principle with regard to the supply of arms and equipment which the United States offered Israel in exchange for a Sinai withdrawal. According to the paper, the obstacles which Schlesinger put in the way of arms supplies to Israel were the straw that broke the camel's back.